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Stress Testing Governance
Rory Van Loo *
In their efforts to guard against the world’s greatest threats,
administrative agencies and businesses have in recent years increasingly used
stress tests. Stress tests simulate doomsday scenarios to ensure that the
organization is prepared to respond. For example, agencies role-played a deadly
pandemic spreading from China to the United States the year before COVID19, acted out responses to a hypothetical hurricane striking New Orleans
months before Hurricane Katrina devastated the city, and required banks to
model their ability to withstand a recession prior to the economic downturn of
2020. But too often these exercises have failed to significantly improve readiness
for the subsequent crises. This Article shows that stress tests are used more
widely than is commonly assumed, reaching well beyond financial regulation.
It then argues that administrative stress tests should be seen as potentially
powerful tools for administrative governance, but ones that suffer from
significant shortcomings as currently deployed. Most notably, stress tests lack
adequate transparency, oversight, and imagination. Also, they are too often
voluntary for businesses and agencies whose performance failures could have
great societal ramifications. By depriving stakeholders of crucial information
about organizational readiness, these shortcomings weaken the nation’s ability
to prevent and prepare for disasters. Preparing for disasters will only become
more important as technologies transform everything from stock trading to
elections and climate change creates more volatile weather. With improved
design and wider deployment, stress tests have the potential to become a central
tool for public and private accountability in an era of escalating societal risks.
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INTRODUCTION
Stress tests emerged in the sixteenth century as an engineering
exercise for determining whether a structure might break when faced
with an external shock such as a storm, an earthquake, or flooding. 1
They serve to focus engineers’ minds on worst-case scenarios—such as
an airplane wing or bridge breaking—that people tend to ignore
because they subconsciously avoid thinking about unlikely, terrifying
events. 2 By forcing the engineer to simulate that worst-case scenario,
stress tests also aim to provide information about structural changes
that might be needed to prevent catastrophic collapses. 3
Centuries after their emergence in engineering, the
administrative state has begun to broadly embrace stress tests as a way

1.
2.
3.

See ARNOLD W. HENDRY, ELEMENTS OF EXPERIMENTAL STRESS ANALYSIS 63 (1964).
See id.
See id.
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to prepare for dire circumstances. 4 The Pentagon regularly conducts
war games, including preparing for a North Korean nuclear attack
through a computer simulation of command headquarters and over
thirty thousand troops on the ground in South Korea participating in
corresponding drills. 5 The Federal Aviation Administration issued a
rule stating that all major airports at least once every three years “must
hold a full-scale airport emergency plan exercise,” including for bombs,
fires, natural disasters, and hijackings. 6 And after a tsunami triggered
the meltdown of nuclear plant reactors in Fukushima, Japan, which
contaminated nearby communities with radiation, regulators around
the globe obliged power plant operators to simulate related
breakdowns. 7
Each of these contexts shows a government agency using stress
tests broadly defined, 8 in that a simulation aims to assess critical
breaking points by subjecting the organization to extreme conditions.
Stress tests are targeted at threats that allow too little time to act to
prevent large-scale harm once they materialize.
Despite having the potential to make a difference between life
and death on a mass scale, the widespread use of agency stress tests
has gone unidentified in the legal literature. When scholars have
turned their attention to stress tests, the focus has mostly been on
regulators’ stress testing of financial institutions, rather than stress
testing administrative agencies or other businesses. 9
4.
Legal scholars mostly use the term stress test in the context of finance. This Article’s
broad view of stress tests reflects the widespread use of the term in engineering, medicine, the
military, and elsewhere. See, e.g., Peter Behr, Multinational Panel Calls for Tougher ‘Stress Tests’
TIMES
(June
2,
2011),
of
Nuclear
Plant
Safety
Systems,
N.Y.
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/06/02/02climatewire-multinationalpanel-calls-for-tougher-stress-33984.html?pagewanted=2
[https://perma.cc/8XWR-K7HN]
(referring to nuclear plant exercises as stress tests).
5.
The Editorial Board, Opinion, Trump Gets Exercised over Exercises, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6,
2019, 7:18 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-gets-exercised-over-exercises-11551917921
[https://perma.cc/7VGQ-NJX9] (“[S]tress-testing U.S. forces is not a waste of money.”).
6.
14 C.F.R. § 139.325(h) (2021).
7.
See generally Stephen G. Burns, The Fukushima Daiichi Accident: The International
Community Responds, 11 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 739 (2012) (discussing the international
response, including using stress tests to determine whether other plants were prepared).
8.
This Article’s contributions do not depend on any particular definition of stress tests. In
the legal literature the term has typically been used more narrowly to refer mostly to bank stress
tests, but it has broader use in other academic fields and among public leaders. See, e.g., Kayla
Tausche, White House Studying Supply Chain ‘Stress Tests’ After Semiconductor Shortages,
Sources Say, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/01/white-house-studying-supply-chain-stresstests-after-semiconductor-shortages-sources-say-.html (last updated Apr. 1, 2021, 12:21 PM)
[https://perma.cc/Q324-ZJBB] (“As part of an ongoing review into critical supply chains, the Biden
administration is considering requesting that supply chains undergo ‘stress tests’ of hypothetical
scenarios . . . .”).
9.
See, e.g., Mehrsa Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1247, 1318
(2014) (proposing improvements to financial regulators’ use of hypotheticals); Kathryn Judge,
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This Article marks stress tests as central tools of modern
governance. It demonstrates the breadth of the administrative state’s
use of stress tests across diverse agencies. It then diagnoses why
agencies too often ignore the alarm bells that the tests sound, like when
the Department of Health and Human Services in 2019 surfaced critical
shortcomings after getting hundreds of government officials to role-play
their responses to a pandemic that would kill 110 million people
worldwide. 10 Finally, the Article sketches an expanded vision for stress
tests to combat the rising complexity of crises in an age of economic
insecurity, digital innovation, and global warming.
Despite scholarly inattention, stress tests intersect with vibrant
administrative law conversations. The dominant preoccupation of
administrative law is the accountability of unelected bureaucrats. 11 In
that literature, accountability advances both legitimacy and
effectiveness. 12 A significant strand of administrative law scholarship
Stress Testing During Times of War 1 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 529/2020,
2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3633310 [https://perma.cc/45M8PLGY] (arguing that bank “stress tests become more important, not less, in the midst of systemic
distress, but only if the stress scenarios are modified to reflect the distinct challenges an economy
is facing”); Robert Weber, A Theory for Deliberation-Oriented Stress Testing Regulation, 98 MINN.
L. REV. 2236, 2243 (2014) (offering reforms for financial stress tests). To elaborate, although those
articles provide valuable insights on which this Article builds, their focus is mostly different in two
main ways. Most importantly, because the financial regulation stress test literature is about a
particular industry, it does not examine the breadth of stress tests across the administrative state.
Additionally, bank stress tests are not about stress testing the regulators—they are about stress
testing the banks. This Article, in contrast, focuses on stress testing agencies. This Article also
builds on two innovative articles focused on bank regulation that begin to go in the direction of
considering agencies, but in narrower ways. First, John Crawford proposes training exercises for
bank regulators to address inexperience. John Crawford, Wargaming Financial Crises: The
Problem of (In)experience and Regulator Expertise, 34 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 111, 113 (2015).
More recently, Matthew Turk proposes using bank stress tests to analyze the rules that financial
regulators have written for stress tests. Matthew C. Turk, Stress Testing the Banking Agencies,
105 IOWA L. REV. 1701, 1750–51 (2020). Besides differing from this Article by focusing on financial
regulation, Turk’s proposal is still not about stress testing agencies—despite the title—but instead
on testing the rules they write for bank stress tests. Both of those valuable financial regulation
articles differ from this Article’s emphasis on stress tests created for the purpose of testing the
agencies’ overall preparedness for a crisis on an organizational (or administrative) level.
10. See infra Section I.B.
11. See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, Democratic Enforcement? Accountability and Independence
for the Litigation State, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 929, 942 (2017) (explaining accountability).
12. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation After Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass’ns, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 452, 485 (2002) (“[Administrative law principles] require agencies in
general to articulate a basis for their policy determinations and, in particular, to articulate the
standards for those determinations.”); Jessica Mantel, Procedural Safeguards for Agency
Guidance: A Source of Legitimacy for the Administrative State, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 343, 348 (2009)
(“[E]nsuring that our government meets the public’s needs depends on not only promoting the
legitimacy of the administrative state, but also preserving the administrative state’s ability to
effectively exercise its powers.”); Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the AntiAdministrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (2005) (embracing more expansive concept of
accountability).
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can thus be seen as examining tools that provide better oversight of how
well government actors are deploying the authority delegated to them.
Congress arguably has a “constitutional duty to supervise”
administrative agencies. 13 Moreover, because administrative law has
traditionally focused on rulemaking and formal adjudication, scholars
have called for the field to better reflect the full array of activities that
agencies undertake. 14
This Article responds to those calls by showing how welldesigned stress tests can provide Congress with a mechanism to
supervise agencies’ readiness to safeguard society. Furthermore, the
modern era of regulation and risk management is characterized by
heavy privatization in that businesses often perform the key risk
management functions that the state might otherwise assume. 15 Thus,
mandating stress testing of banks, oil companies, or other businesses is
related to mandating stress tests of administrative agencies in the
sense that both private firms and public agencies are entities along the
chain of delegated public authority. 16
Another strand of the literature has analyzed the broader sphere
of activity on which stress tests arguably build: risk management. That
research shows how agencies quantitatively model the risks of the next
financial, environmental, or public health calamity. 17 Sophisticated risk
13. See Gillian B. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1874–
1904 (2015).
14. See Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 96–97 (2003) (highlighting many ways in which the APA fails to reflect
large parts of what administrative agencies actually do and concluding “[i]t is time to rewrite the
Administrative Procedure Act”); Lemos, supra note 11 (emphasizing unlocking the black box of
agency enforcement).
15. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing
Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 691, 726 (2003); Jody
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 549–56 (2000); Gillian E.
Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1369 (2003); Martha Minow,
Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1237–
42 (2003).
16. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms,
Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 384 & nn.12–
13 (2006) (discussing privatized risk management as delegation).
17. For a review of risk-based regulation, or risk management, see generally, for example, id.
at 467–68 (discussing “[i]ncorporating organizational learning approaches into regulatory and
agency design” as a means of managing risk); Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting
Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255 (2004) (evaluating
the EPA’s approach to risk management); Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information
Age, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 369, 390 (2016) (underscoring the growing importance of
regulators managing risks); James Fanto, Anticipating the Unthinkable: The Adequacy of Risk
Management in Finance and Environmental Studies, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 731 (2009)
(covering risk management in financial and environmental regulation); Kathryn Judge,
Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN.
L. REV. 657, 659–61 (2012) (depicting inadequate financial risk management efforts); and J.B.
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modeling, however, does not mean that agencies already undertake
stress tests. Stress tests go beyond modeling threats, such as the risk of
a natural disaster or financial crisis, to assess how well private or public
organizations would respond to those threats. Stress tests thus
incorporate elements of scenario analysis and simulations. 18
To illustrate how stress tests fit into the broader toolkit for risk
management, consider by analogy how cardiologists regularly conduct
“stress tests” by putting patients on treadmills and gradually ramping
up the speed to see how their bodies react when pushed. 19 Poor results
prompt preventive advice to exercise more, eat better, or take
medication. 20 In contrast, agencies’ risk projections analogize to a
different procedure undertaken by cardiologists: the sophisticated
analysis of bloodwork, which can be used to give the patient health
information. Although valuable, analyzing blood is not the same as
conducting a treadmill test. 21 Similarly, agency risk analytics do not
test organizational readiness in the same way as would a stress test
requiring agency leaders to make decisions, develop plans, and solve
problems in the simulation of, say, a nuclear attack.
The difference is subtle, but the stakes are high. Medical stress
tests have saved countless lives by alerting people to heightened risks
of heart disease—the leading cause of death worldwide. 22 Evidence
Ruhl, Managing Systemic Risk in Legal Systems, 89 IND. L.J. 559, 602–03 (2014) (applying
complexity science to legal regimes for environmental and other areas of disaster management).
18. The boundary lines between risk management tools are often blurred. Stress tests have
significant characteristics that overlap with various scenario planning tools and could be broadly
classified as a type of scenario planning—indeed, robust stress tests incorporate scenario analyses.
See infra Section II.C. Stress tests could be seen as a more organizationally focused and
simulation-intensive form of scenario planning. Cf. Axel Volkery & Teresa Ribeiro, Scenario
Planning in Public Policy: Understanding Use, Impacts and the Role of Institutional Context
Factors, 76 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 1198, 1199 (2009) (adopting a broad definition of
scenario planning as reaching threats, policies, and organizational blind spots). However, stress
tests also combine elements of war games, or simulations, which are sometimes viewed as distinct
from scenario planning. See, e.g., Jan Oliver Schwarz, Camelia Ram & René Rohrbeck, Combining
Scenario Planning and Business Wargaming to Better Anticipate Future Competitive Dynamics,
105 FUTURES 133, 135 (2019) (distinguishing wargaming from scenario planning). How to classify
stress tests is less important than determining how to optimize stress tests’ contributions to
governance. The broad literature on scenario planning provides helpful foundations but scenario
planning has so many different forms that the literature tends to pay insufficient attention to key
stress test characteristics of simulative testing and organizational readiness, which are
particularly important in the context of administrative accountability. See, e.g., Volkery & Ribeiro,
supra (reviewing the literature on scenario planning with limited attention to these
characteristics).
19. See generally Stephen N. Morris & Paul L. McHenry, Role of Exercise Stress Testing in
Healthy Subjects and Patients with Coronary Heart Disease, 42 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 659 (1978).
20. Id. at 663.
21. See infra Part I (describing stress tests used by administrative agencies and how they
differ from risk management practices).
22. Morris & McHenry, supra note 19, at 659.
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suggests that in at least some organizational contexts—such as
firefighting units, air traffic control towers, and other high-reliability
organizations—intense simulations can meaningfully increase the
chances of success in the face of an emergency. 23 Yet when designed
poorly, they can have little or no effect, thereby simply wasting
resources better used elsewhere. 24 Effective stress tests thus can mean
the difference between success and failure on a large scale.
Moreover, stress tests are tools well suited to the modern era.
Administering the law has become far more complicated because
technologies enable catastrophes on a previously unimaginable scale. 25
Weather shocks to our infrastructure will become more frequent and
intense due to climate change. 26 Stress tests are the kind of tool that
may be crucial to reach the next level of administrative risk
management for an increasingly complex world.
It is worth considering whether a new paradigm is needed for
stress tests to fulfill their governance potential. Agencies need regular
assessments of their organizational readiness for larger scale threats.
But left to their own devices, they often design stress tests in ways that
obscure institutional failures, which saves face but makes learning—
and valuable change—less likely. 27 To maximize stress test benefits, in
at least some important contexts the law should involve actors outside
23. See, e.g., KARL E. WEICK & KATHLEEN M. SUTCLIFFE, MANAGING THE UNEXPECTED:
RESILIENT PERFORMANCE IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 1–2 (2d ed. 2007) (referring to diverse
organizational responses to emergencies); Jos A. Rijpma, From Deadlock to Dead End: The Normal
Accidents—High Reliability Debate Revisited, 11 J. CONTINGENCIES & CRISIS MGMT. 37, 37–39
(2003) (summarizing the academic literature on high-reliability organizations); see also Weber,
supra note 9, at 2243 (applying “high-reliability organizations” to financial regulation). The
evidence is strongest for individuals participating in emergency simulations. See, e.g., Alexis Borg
Sapiano, Roberta Sammut & Josef Trapani, The Effectiveness of Virtual Simulation in Improving
Student Nurses’ Knowledge and Performance During Patient Deterioration: A Pre and Post Test
Design, 62 NURSE EDUC. TODAY 128 (2018) (finding that students who took part in virtual
simulations testing complex emergency situations, such as rapid patient deterioration, tested
better after performing in the scenario); Robert T. Hays, John W. Jacobs, Carolyn Prince &
Eduardo Salas, Flight Simulator Training Effectiveness: A Meta-Analysis, 4 MIL. PSYCH. 63 (1992)
(examining twenty-six experiments testing the efficacy of flight simulator training and noting
which characteristics provided the most benefits); Ioana Koglbauer, Simulator Training Improves
Pilots’ Procedural Memory and Generalization of Behavior in Critical Flight Situations, 20
COGNITION BRAIN BEHAV. 357 (2016) (finding that pilots who underwent simulated training
performed better in critical flight situations).
24. See infra Section I.C.
25. David L. Alderson & John C. Doyle, Contrasting Views of Complexity and Their
Implications for Network-Centric Infrastructures, 40 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYS. MAN &
CYBERNETICS 839, 843 (2010) (“[M]odern institutions and technologies . . . enable catastrophes on
a scale unimaginable without them . . . .”).
26. See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock & Deborah M. Chizewer, Living with Water in a ClimateChanged World: Will Federal Flood Policy Sink or Swim?, 46 ENV’T L. 491, 491–92 (2016)
(summarizing the consensus on climate change implications).
27. See infra Part I.
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the responsible agency in the design, management, and evaluation of
stress tests. Those actors would ideally also help address stress test
deficits in imagining future threats and conveying the full consequences
of failing to prepare—including the often underappreciated economic
costs of crises.
Involvement by the public, Congress, or the White House would
help. A new risk management group, whether standalone or located in
an existing governmental entity such as the Government
Accountability Office, could also play a meta-agency stress test
supervisory role. The new paradigm needed is thus to shift from viewing
stress tests as voluntary agency exercises, or something mandated of
banks, toward viewing them as broader legal tools for governance
accountability.
The challenging task would then be to determine when the costs
justify the accountability benefits. At a minimum, the significant
current resources devoted to stress tests throughout the administrative
state could be put to better use. If infused by the law with external
oversight, stress tests will have greater potential to jostle a too often
inert administrative state into greater efficacy in safeguarding society.
Part I shows the widespread use of stress tests and their
shortcomings by looking at three case studies in public health, the
environment, and the financial system. Part II begins the task of
reconceptualizing these exercises as big-picture, future-oriented, and
transparent tests of the government. Part III illustrates how revived
stress tests could improve agencies’ ability to guard against pandemics,
environmental disasters, and financial crises. It also briefly considers
contexts, such as supply-chain management and cybersecurity, in
which mandates might be extended to businesses. Stress tests have the
potential to play a considerably broader role than they currently do in
both public- and private-sector accountability.
Before turning to the main discussion, two notes on scope and
limits are in order. This Article integrates discussions of stress testing
of administrative agencies with stress testing of private firms. Although
these two contexts differ in meaningful ways, they also have important
similarities given the goal here of framing stress tests as a governance
tool. The meaningful differences between these contexts are worthy of
further study and elaboration. Moreover, not all of the discussion below,
which focuses more on stress testing administrative agencies, applies
to mandated stress testing of firms. Nonetheless, many of this Article’s
core high-level themes, such as stress test shortcomings and potential,
apply to both contexts.
Also, the direct empirical basis for expanding administrative
stress tests is limited. That limitation reflects the broader difficulty in
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studying rare events, which are by definition so small in number as to
defy robust statistical study. Moreover, each oil spill or financial crisis
tends to unfold differently, with a complex variety of politics, funding
constraints, and other factors contributing to any given decision not to
take a preparatory step. 28 Consequently, it is almost impossible to know
either why leaders failed to take adequate precautions or the
counterfactual of what would have happened if stress tests had been
used more effectively. It is also difficult to quantify the benefits of crisis
prevention, or of improving accountability—as is the case with other
pervasive administrative tools, such as notice-and-comment
rulemaking. This Article’s recommendations should thus be viewed as
working hypotheses identifying sensible steps based on an inference
from what is known about simulations, the limitations of organizational
preparedness, and accountability. The main aim here is to draw
attention to these tools’ widespread use, to call for greater study of
them, and to theorize their broader potential role in governance.
Despite epistemic limitations, the widespread adoption of stress
tests in construction and cardiology was driven not by statistically
significant evidence that they worked, but by common sense
innovation. 29 Lawmakers and agency leaders are the primary architects
and caretakers of the administrative state. Just as no architect would
construct a major building without considering what can be learned
from stress tests, legal designers should give greater attention to
integrating stress tests into the continually updated blueprints of the
administrative state.
I. THE PROMISE, PERVASIVENESS, AND FAILURES OF STRESS TESTS
Administrative stress tests mostly aim to improve the
organizational management of crises. They may do so by enhancing an
agency’s ability to prevent the emergency from materializing, or by
promoting better advanced planning so that the agency can reduce the
harm from the adverse event once it occurs. To provide institutional
context for how stress tests might improve those difficult tasks, this
Part considers the state’s lack of preparation, underlying psychological
explanations, and current use of stress tests.
28. See infra Section II.C.
29. See Mohamed K. ElBatanouny, Gregor Schacht & Guido Bolle, History of Load Testing of
Bridges, in 12 LOAD TESTING OF BRIDGES 9, 11 (Eva O.L. Lantsoght ed., 2019) (“[I]nitially no
empirical data or previous knowledge was available with respect to what constituted allowable or
critical structural states.”); Michael W. Luong, Maya Ignaszewski & C.M. Taylor, Stress Testing:
A Contribution from Dr. Robert A. Bruce, Father of Exercise Cardiology, 58 BC MED. J. 70, 71
(2016) (describing how Dr. Robert Bruce revolutionized exercise stress tests in cardiology).
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A. The Organizational Aims of Stress Tests
1. Addressing the Psychological Limits of Crisis Management
At their engineering core, stress tests produce information that
is valuable for evaluating readiness for hypothetical scenarios and
responding to the human mind’s psychological limits. 30 Although the
information-gathering goal of stress tests is straightforward, the
psychological dimension would benefit from brief elaboration.
When imagining the likelihood of future events occurring, people
envision familiar scenarios—a phenomenon known as the “availability
heuristic.” 31 The mind tends not to think about rare events, especially
ones that the individual has never experienced. 32 Thus, one challenge
for crisis management is getting people to think about something that
the mind tends to avoid.
Nor do near misses necessarily help to prompt action. A case
study of the underlying psychology comes from space travel. 33 In several
launches, NASA scientists observed a threat: insulation foam shedding
from an external fuel tank, which once even damaged a wing in the
process. 34 Instead of learning from the evidence that a dangerous crash
risk existed, however, they interpreted the absence of a crash as a
success—an “outcome bias.” 35 This encouraged the inference that the
foam shedding was not as dangerous as originally thought, or at least
not as worthy of attention. 36 That bias proved fatal to seven
crewmembers in 2003, when foam shedding punctured a hole in the
wing of the Columbia space shuttle, causing the shuttle to disintegrate
upon reentry into the atmosphere. 37 Counterintuitively, in the wake of

30. See HENDRY, supra note 1; Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Derivatives: A Fundamental
Rethinking, 70 DUKE L.J. 545, 585 (2020) (discussing stress tests as a means of addressing
cognitive biases).
31. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCH. 207, 229 (1973) (“In thinking of [rare] events we often construct
scenarios . . . . The plausibility of the scenarios that come to mind, or the difficulty of producing
them, then serve as a clue to the likelihood of the event.”).
32. Id.
33. Robin L. Dillon & Catherine H. Tinsley, How Near-Misses Influence Decision Making
Under Risk: A Missed Opportunity for Learning, 54 MGMT. SCI. 1425, 1427–28 (2008).
34. 1 NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., REPORT OF COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
BOARD 128 fig.6.1-7 (2003).
35. See 1 id.; Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation, 54
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 569, 569 (1988).
36. Dillon & Tinsley, supra note 33, at 1427–28.
37. 1 NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., supra note 34, at 121.
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close calls without any consequences, people across diverse
organizations tend to lower their estimates of accompanying risks. 38
The human mind fares better in the wake of actual tragedies.
Once a tragedy occurs, people tend to invest in additional precautions
in the immediate aftermath. 39 However, since rare crises that occurred
many years ago will not be “available” to the mind, 40 over time they may
return to being overlooked or discounted. 41 These psychological
challenges, exacerbated by organizational dynamics and market
failures, 42 help explain why policymakers have added stress tests to
their toolkits. A stress test seeks to address these psychological
shortcomings by causing people to regularly experience a simulated
crisis, rather than a real-world near miss, thereby keeping the threat
and its consequences top of mind.
2. Improving Existing Administrative Risk Management
Stress tests layer onto a larger administrative state apparatus
for managing risks. The risk management toolkit includes threat
forecasting, scenario analysis, and other tools that are designed to
unearth the likelihood and nature of future challenges such as natural
disasters. 43 The law often imposes precautions on private entities as
well, such as requiring banks to have sufficient capital reserves to
withstand a financial crisis or mandating that airlines have emergency
procedures in place. 44 A comprehensive review of these alternatives to
38. See Dillon & Tinsley, supra note 33, at 1436–38 (finding that near misses may decrease
perceived risk).
39. For examples and factors influencing such calls, see, for example, Thomas A. Birkland &
Megan K. Warnement, Focusing Events, Risk & Regulation, in POLICY SHOCK: RECALIBRATING
RISK AND REGULATION AFTER OIL SPILLS, NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, AND FINANCIAL CRISES 107, 118–
20 (Edward J. Balleisen, Lori S. Bennear, Kimberly D. Krawiec & Jonathan B. Wiener eds., 2017)
(noting that the greater the “perceived lack of control, dread, catastrophic potential, fatal
consequences, and the inequitable distribution of risks and benefits . . . the more likely there will
be greater attention to an event and call for regulatory action” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
40. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 31, at 228.
41. Id. at 228–29.
42. The costs of global warming or a financial crisis are shared broadly. In contrast, the gains
of oil drilling or bank investments concentrate in the executives of a few companies undertaking
those activities. These market failures help explain the need for public imposition of risk
identification on even economically rational private actors. See, e.g., Richard Squire, Shareholder
Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1152 (2010) (showing how
“seemingly reckless conduct . . . can in fact be fully rational from the perspective of shareholders”).
43. See, e.g., Robert F. Weber, The Corporate Finance Case for Deliberation-Oriented Stress
Testing Regulation, 39 J. CORP. L. 833, 848–50 (2014) (identifying private-sector risk measurement
tools such as value-at-risk, expected shortfall, risk-adjusted return on capital, scenario analysis,
decision tree analysis, and Monte Carlo modeling).
44. See Fanto, supra note 17, at 736 (discussing the “growth in the importance of risk
management” in “the regulation of capital”); Terry L. Turner, Note, Carry-On Baggage—Are the
Regulations Doing Their Job?, 63 J. AIR L. & COM. 565, 569 (1998) (analyzing airline regulations
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stress tests, and a comparison to each, is beyond the scope of this
Article. However, a quick sketch of the administrative state’s risk
management trajectory will provide some helpful background for seeing
stress tests’ potential contributions to existing governance.
Agencies have long attempted to lessen risks by pervasively
deploying inspectors, examiners, and other regulatory monitors to
ensure that businesses are following the law. 45 In response to Civil
War–era financial instability that threatened to undermine the North’s
military campaign, Congress ordered routine examinations of banks. 46
In 1907, federal inspections of meat manufacturers started after Upton
Sinclair’s The Jungle exposed vermin-infested facilities. 47
Regulatory monitoring ultimately took a risk management turn,
led by shifts in the private sector. In 1984, a poisonous gas leak at a
plant in Bhopal, India, killed over three thousand people in nearby
villages and injured many more. 48 The plant’s owner, Union Carbide,
was one of the world’s largest businesses but closed down due to the
incident. 49 Events such as the Bhopal gas leak spurred a new paradigm
across diverse industries in which the law compelled businesses to
develop risk management plans that regulators then audited and in
many cases supplemented with their own risk assessments. 50
For instance, authorized by the Clean Air Act, 51 the EPA
promulgated rules requiring companies working with large quantities
of toxic chemicals to submit a hazard analysis of ways that unintended
that “evolved under a discussion of problems associated with crashworthiness and emergency
evacuation procedures”).
45. See Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors: Policing Firms in the Compliance Era, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 369, 384–86 (2019) (summarizing the history of regulatory monitoring).
46. National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, § 1, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.) (establishing the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and providing it
with authority to examine banks); ROSS M. ROBERTSON, THE COMPTROLLER AND BANK
SUPERVISION: A HISTORICAL APPRAISAL 24–26 (1968) (providing a history of bank examinations).
47. See Meat Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 59-242, 34 Stat. 1260 (1907) (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 601-695 (2012)); Roger Roots, A Muckraker’s Aftermath: The Jungle of Meat-Packing Regulation
After a Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2413, 2417–19 (2001).
48. See, e.g., Sukanya Pillay, Absence of Justice: Lessons from the Bhopal Union Carbide
Disaster for Latin America, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 479, 483–84 (2006).
49. See id.
50. See, e.g., Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 15, at 725 (“[M]anagement-based regulation
shifts the locus of policy decisionmaking from the government to private parties.”); Bradley C.
Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking,
Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 260 (2001) (depicting toxic releases inventory
requirements as “a watershed, pioneering the systematic use of performance monitoring and
benchmarking as regulatory tools” (footnote omitted)); Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as
Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 461 (2011)
(summarizing moves in the chemical manufacturing, nuclear, and financial industries toward risk
assessment and self-regulation).
51. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399, 2571 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 7412) (mandating that the EPA write risk management regulations).
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release might occur. The companies must rank the possibilities by
factors such as the number of people hypothetically contaminated. 52
The firms must then develop written operating procedures for
emergency situations. 53 Agencies also model future risks of financial
shocks, environmental catastrophes, or other threats. 54
Yet regulatory monitoring checks whether firms are complying
with existing legal requirements—meaning that those examinations
de-bias best if the legal rule writers have sufficiently removed their own
biases. 55 Moreover, observers have concluded that when both private
and public actors create risk management plans, they tend to make
familiar and comfortable assumptions, 56 in line with the psychological
tendencies discussed above. The forecasting of an event makes the
individual think about it, but (like having a near miss) that is not the
same as experiencing the event. 57 By creating a false sense of security
without addressing those psychological biases, regulatory monitoring
and threat modeling can breed complacency. 58
Stress tests aim to address the availability heuristic more
directly than do regulatory monitoring and risk forecasting. Roleplaying simulations would do this by causing people to experience the
consequences of a rare emergency that may not otherwise be top of
mind, thereby making it more likely that participants will later recall
that threat when planning. Like an accelerating treadmill exploring the
outer bounds of a patient’s heart health, an administrative stress test
aims to push an organization beyond its comfort zone to uncover
complacency and prompt change.
B. Case Studies in Current Stress Tests
This Section considers three areas in which agencies run stress
tests: public health, the environment, and finance. These three areas
52. 40 C.F.R. § 68 (2007).
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Baradaran, supra note 9, at 1250; Fanto, supra note 17, at 733–35 (analyzing
environmental law risk management); Judge, supra note 17, at 659–61.
55. See Van Loo, supra note 45, at 399 (discussing risk management plans in the context of
regulatory monitoring).
56. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 72 (2003) (“Heuristics play a large role in how regulators make decisions.”); Cohen, supra
note 17, at 390–91 (observing shortcomings in risk analyses).
57. See supra Section I.A.1.
58. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 17, at 390–91 (“Reliance on risk assessment and risk
management discourses also can induce unwarranted complacency and encourage excessive risktaking.”); see also Jerome H. Powell, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Welcoming
Remarks at Stress Testing: A Discussion and Review (Jul. 9, 2019) (observing that routine
examinations can breed complacency).
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are a subset of public stress tests, which occur at all levels of federal,
state, and local government in areas ranging from power grid failures
to fire prevention. 59 Although stress tests in different areas may have
distinct dynamics, these case studies illustrate both what stress tests
offer and how they are limited as currently implemented.
1. Public Health
For years, the Department of Health and Human Services
(“HHS”) has attempted to focus health care actors’ minds on
catastrophes by mandating an annual “coalition surge test.” 60 HHS
requires hospital groups and public health agencies to participate in
these tests as a condition of receiving federal funding. 61 Prompted by
events such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks and Hurricane Katrina, which
exceeded hospitals’ capacities, these tests assess local funding
recipients’ “ability to work in a coordinated way using their own
systems and plans to find appropriate destinations for patients” during
an unprecedented need for evacuations. 62
In 2019, HHS also voluntarily completed an ambitious pandemic
stress test. The Spanish Flu of 1918 infected about one-third of the
global population and killed more people than World War I. 63 For years
before COVID-19 arrived, “[v]irtually all experts agree[d] that it is not
a question of if but when another influenza pandemic as deadly as the
59. See, e.g., Preparing for a Catastrophe: The Hurricane Pam Exercise: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affs., 109th Cong. 1, 3 (2006) [hereinafter FEMA
Simulation Comm. Hearing] (statement of Susan M. Collins, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland
Sec. & Governmental Affs.) (mentioning the breadth of simulations); Neal H. Lewis, Interpreting
the Oracle: Licensing Modifications, Economics, Safety, Politics, and the Future of Nuclear Power
in the United States, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 27, 46 (2006) (explaining how a simulation indicated
that an Oak Ridge National Laboratory plant should be shut down because a power blackout would
generate lethal, uncontainable radiation); see also PAC. GAS & ELEC. CO., AMENDED 2019 WILDFIRE
SAFETY PLAN 34 (Feb. 2019), https://www.pge.com/pge_global/common/pdfs/safety/emergencypreparedness/natural-disaster/wildfires/Wildfire-Safety-Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/XM9T2G87]
(summarizing an exercise in which local traffic authorities and the responsible utility company
launched simulations in high-risk areas to ensure adequate evacuation routes and procedures).
60. OFF. OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PREPAREDNESS & RESPONSE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS., 2017-2022 HOSPITAL PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM: PERFORMANCE MEASURES
IMPLEMENTATION
GUIDE
5
(2017),
https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/hpp/reports/Documents/hpp-pmi-guidance-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5ZR7-B9X6] [hereinafter HHS PERFORMANCE MEASURES].
61. Id.
62. Id. at 32.
63. Andrew Burns, Dominique van der Mensbrugghe & Hans Timmer, Evaluating the
Economic
Consequences
of
Avian
Influenza
(2008)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237345628_Evaluating_the_Economic_Consequences_o
f_Avian_Influenza1 [https://perma.cc/JFZ2-VQTG] (originally published in slightly different form
in WORLD BANK, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE: THE DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL OF SURGING
CAPITAL FLOWS 36 (2006)).
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Spanish Flu will occur.” 64 Forecasts predicted that if such a pandemic
materialized, it could result in at least two hundred million deaths,
including millions in the United States alone. 65 The expected economic
costs were also substantial, with the Congressional Budget Office
estimating that a modern pandemic like the Spanish Flu would cost the
world over $3 trillion. 66
In light of those predictions, and following close calls with Ebola
and other outbreaks, the Obama Administration began planning
ambitious role-plays with federal, state, and local officials testing the
nation’s readiness for pandemics. 67 Those efforts culminated in a 2019
exercise under the Trump Administration, codenamed “Crimson
Contagion.” 68 Managed by HHS, officials from the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (“CDC”) and other agencies role-played—
through conference calls and meetings—their coordinated response to a
pandemic that infected 110 million Americans. 69
The simulation lasted eight months in four phases, and involved
participants from twelve federal agencies, twelve states, ninety-six local
jurisdictions, eighty-seven hospitals, and over one hundred privatesector partners. 70 The script released information to participants in real
time, informing them early on that over twelve thousand cases had been
reported in the United States. 71 Role-play participants would then
respond, such as by calling for social distancing and working from home
after being informed of a first wave of U.S. cases. 72

64. Vickie J. Williams, Fluconomics: Preserving Our Hospital Infrastructure During and After
a Pandemic, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 99, 100 (2007); see also Christina Y. Chan,
Support for the First Line of Defense in Public Health Emergencies, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1347, 1348–
49 (2011) (“Most public health officials agree that it is simply a matter of time before the United
States suffers a disastrous influenza epidemic.”).
65. Burns et al., supra note 63.
66. Id.; see also ROBERT ARNOLD, JEANNE DE SA, TIM GRONNIGER, ALLISON PERCY & JULIE
SOMERS, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, A POTENTIAL INFLUENZA PANDEMIC: POSSIBLE MACROECONOMIC
EFFECTS AND POLICY ISSUES 44 (July 2006), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/109thcongress-2005-2006/reports/12-08-birdflu.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Z6H-PJP8].
67. David E. Sanger, Eric Lipton, Eileen Sullivan & Michael Crowley, Before Virus Outbreak,
a
Cascade
of
Warnings
Went
Unheeded,
N.Y.
TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-outbreak.html (last updated
Sept. 4, 2021) [https://perma.cc/SK5C-MEF3].
68. See OFF. OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PREPAREDNESS & RESPONSE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUM. SERVS., CRIMSON CONTAGION 2019 FUNCTIONAL EXERCISE: DRAFT AFTER-ACTION REPORT
5, app. A (Oct. 2019), https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/6824-2019-10-key-findings-andafter/05bd797500ea55be0724/optimized/full.pdf#page=1
[https://perma.cc/8SY9-HX4R]
[hereinafter HHS PANDEMIC SIMULATION DRAFT REP.] (unpublished draft).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2–5, app. A.
71. Sanger et al., supra note 67.
72. See HHS PANDEMIC SIMULATION DRAFT REP., supra note 68, at 23.
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HHS produced a report at the end of the simulation that
suggested the U.S. public health infrastructure was unprepared for a
major pandemic. The lack of preparedness identified fell into two main
infrastructural categories of note: hospitals and laboratories.
In terms of health care, the Crimson Contagion report identified
the challenge of shortages for ventilators, needles, syringes, and other
supplies. 73 The United States later faced these same problems in
responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. For instance, adequate health
care infrastructure for a pandemic requires surge capacity—the ability
to accommodate a huge increase in persons requiring care. 74 Yet
doctors, nurses, and other crucial medical personnel lacked adequate
masks during early COVID-19 surges. This shortage caused more
health care workers to become sick and die and thus deprived the health
care system of sufficient support in some areas. 75
Access to a hospital bed with a functioning ventilator has made
the difference between life and death for many patients struck with
COVID-19-induced pneumonia. 76 Yet the nation had only a fraction of
the ventilators and beds needed in some areas, leaving many without
lifesaving treatment. 77
Finally, scientific infrastructure means, among other things,
virus screening (testing). A key failure of Crimson Contagion was not
considering the nation’s capacity for ramping up screening. 78 Screening
patients is essential for slowing the spread of a pandemic because it
allows officials to identify, trace, and quarantine those who are
73. Id. at 39.
74. Williams, supra note 64, at 132.
75. Kent Babb, Brittany Shammas & Ariana Eunjung Cha, Hundreds of Health-Care Workers
Lost Their Lives Battling the Coronavirus, Now a Series of ‘What Ifs’ Haunt Their Friends and
POST
(June
17,
2020),
Colleagues.,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/health/healthcare-workers-deathcoronavirus/?itid=lk_inline_manual_30 [https://perma.cc/R7VF-9DRD] (“[For healthcare workers,
s]imply reporting for work can mean gambling with your life, and the odds grow longer when
masks and other personal protective equipment become difficult to get.”).
76. Interim Clinical Guidance for Management of Patients with Confirmed Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-19), CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/clinical-guidancemanagement-patients.html (last updated Feb. 16, 2021) [https://perma.cc/L8Z5-AGJE]
[hereinafter COVID-19 Interim Clinical Guidance].
77. See, e.g., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OEI-06-2000300, HOSPITAL EXPERIENCES RESPONDING TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: RESULTS OF A
NATIONAL PULSE SURVEY MARCH 23-27, 2020 (2020), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-2000300.pdf [https://perma.cc/LVU3-FEQ6] (describing how testing shortages created a lack of bed
space and lack of personal protective equipment); Nicholas Kulish, Sarah Kliff & Jessica SilverGreenberg, The U.S. Tried to Build a New Fleet of Ventilators. The Mission Failed., N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/29/business/coronavirus-us-ventilator-shortage.html
(last
updated Apr. 20, 2020) [https://perma.cc/HV7B-CEPS] (discussing massive shortage of ventilators
in face of public health crises).
78. HHS PANDEMIC SIMULATION DRAFT REP., supra note 68, at 46.
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infected—the most effective strategy for significantly reducing
mortality. 79
Despite the importance of screening, the United States suffered
from a critical screening capacity shortage for COVID-19 in 2020,
leaving even many high-risk patients untested. 80 A rigid and slow
approval process was part of the problem for lab facilities that sought
to screen. 81 For months, tens of thousands of research and health
facilities across the United States remained dormant even though they
had the capacity to screen in large numbers. 82
Some caution is warranted for quality control and avoiding false
positives. However, better prepared countries successfully balanced
these concerns with dramatically faster responses. The Netherlands
and South Korea, for instance, conducted more than three hundred
times the number of tests per capita than the United States in the first
weeks of the outbreak. 83 Although many factors go into morbidity, these
countries also had forty percent and ninety-eight percent lower deaths
per capita than the United States, respectively. 84 As one epidemiology
professor described it, “The lack of testing in the United States is a
debacle . . . . We’re supposed to be the best biomedical powerhouse in
79. NEIL M. FERGUSON ET AL., IMPERIAL COLL. COVID-19 RESPONSE TEAM, IMPACT OF NONPHARMACEUTICAL INTERVENTIONS (NPIS) TO REDUCE COVID-19 MORTALITY AND HEALTHCARE
DEMAND 1 (Mar. 2020), https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Imperial-CollegeCOVID19-NPI-modelling-16-03-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BTR-KVQ6] (identifying quarantine
as the single most important way to reduce mortality); Brian J. Coburn, Bradley G. Wagner &
Sally Blower, Modeling Influenza Epidemics and Pandemics: Insights into the Future of Swine Flu
(H1N1), BMC MED., June 22, 2009, at 1, 4 (discussing the effectiveness of “household quarantine”
in reducing spread of outbreak).
80. See Andrew Ryan, Kay Lazar & Liz Kowalczyk, Severe Shortage of Tests Blunts
Coronavirus
Response,
Boston
Doctors
Say,
BOS.
GLOBE,
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/03/12/nation/severe-shortage-tests-blunts-coronavirusresponse-boston-doctors-say (last updated Mar. 12, 2020, 12:51 PM) [https://perma.cc/K6LVPRQY].
81. Id.; see also infra Section III.A. Another challenge is having a sufficient amount of the
chemical needed for the test—a chemical that is not specific to coronavirus and thus could have
been held in reserve. See, e.g., Ryan et al., supra note 80 (describing testing shortfalls).
82. See, e.g., United States 2017 Laboratory Market Report - Research and Markets, BUS.
WIRE
(Sept.
29,
2017,
5:31
AM),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20170929005241/en/United-States-2017-LaboratoryMarket-Report [https://perma.cc/M4F5-4T99] (reporting 121,973 laboratory facilities in United
States); see also Ryan et al., supra note 80 (explaining the slow approval testing mobilization).
83. Aylin Woodward & Skye Gould, One Chart Shows How Many Coronavirus Tests Per
Capita Have Been Completed in 8 Countries. The US Is Woefully Behind., BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 9,
2020, 7:20 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-testing-covid-19-tests-per-capitachart-us-behind-2020-3 [perma.cc/U22U-GZCE] (putting the ratio of tests per capita between other
countries and the United States at about 700 for South Korea, 347 for the U.K., 350 for the
Netherlands, and 401 for Israel).
84. See Coronavirus (COVID-19) Deaths Worldwide Per One Million Population as of
(Sept.
5,
2021),
September
28,
2021,
by
Country,
STATISTA
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1104709 [perma.cc/5U4V-854N].
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the world and we’ve been unable to do something that every other
country has been able to do.” 85
Under withering public criticism, the FDA eventually developed
an accelerated approval process for labs seeking to run diagnostics for
COVID-19. 86 In the meantime, however, without the advanced warning
systems that the Crimson Contagion simulation could have identified
as necessary, 87 a deadly virus silently spread for at least six weeks in
communities nationwide. 88
Despite the impossibility of knowing how many fatalities could
have been avoided, the question remains of why even some low-cost
organizational steps were not taken before the pandemic, such as
developing a rapid screening approval process that could be
immediately implemented in the case of emergency. The discussion
below will return to the issue of why Crimson Contagion failed to
prompt more action—why it failed to overcome the psychological
barriers to effective crisis management. For now, the main point is that
despite the simulation and prominent predictions of inevitable largescale contagion, the United States public health system was
underprepared in ways that were or could have been identified by a
stress test in advance.
2. The Environment
Environmental and emergency response agencies commonly
role-play hazards. Those simulations may respond to environmental
catastrophes caused by either nature or industry. For natural disasters,
at various times throughout U.S. history, a single wildfire, drought,
heat wave, or earthquake has taken thousands of American lives and
cost tens of billions of dollars in damage. 89 Fires are growing in
intensity, but in recent decades storms have caused the greatest

85. Ryan et al., supra note 80 (quoting Harvard Professor of Epidemiology Marc Lipsitch).
86. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA Issues
New Policy to Help Expedite Availability of Diagnostics (Feb. 29, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-fda-issues-new-policy-help-expediteavailability-diagnostics [https://perma.cc/8L3M-9BPE].
87. Infra Section III.A.
88. Infra Section III.A (mentioning experts suspecting that further research will likely reveal
that the virus was spreading silently even earlier than six weeks); see also OFF. OF INSPECTOR
GEN., supra note 77, at 5 (discussing how a continued lack of quick testing caused hospital
overcrowding due to inability to move patients out of isolated wards until they were cleared of
having the virus).
89. Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters: Events, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN.,
https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/events
(last
visited
Feb.
17,
2022)
[https://perma.cc/5ZVV-YPL4].

2022]

STRESS TESTING GOVERNANCE

571

destruction. 90 After storms strike, FEMA coordinates national,
regional, state, and local relief. 91 Despite the frequency and magnitude
of extreme storms, and hurricanes in particular, the agency has a mixed
record with them. 92
In the late 1990s the state of Louisiana requested a simulation
of a catastrophic hurricane. 93 FEMA approved the request because after
several close calls of major hurricanes hitting New Orleans, it knew
that the city was susceptible to devastating flooding. 94 However, the
agency lacked a sense of urgency, as would be expected from the
psychological research into how people process close calls. 95 FEMA
repeatedly pushed back the planned start date, ultimately delaying it
over five years, and during that time cut several proposed scenarios. 96
When it ultimately happened in 2004, the exercise was still substantial,
bringing together about three hundred emergency officials from all
levels of state and federal government to decide how they would handle
swamped hospitals, many deaths, and hundreds of thousands of
residents trapped in flooded areas. 97
The following year, Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans.
Despite a recently completed simulation that had assumed thousands
of deaths, FEMA delayed sending rescue workers and supplies. 98 As a
result, many of the over one million displaced local residents went
without food and aid, with some stranded on the roofs of their
submerged homes.
The agency also botched the coordination of nonprofits,
businesses, and government entities by withholding key permissions
needed to mobilize many who stood ready to help with food and medical
supplies. 99 For instance, FEMA turned away truckloads of bottled water
90. Id. Wildfires are second in the past few years and, although unlikely, if that trajectory
continues could eventually rival hurricanes. Id.
91. See, e.g., Yishai Blank & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Reviving Federal Regions, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1895,
1942 (2018) (discussing FEMA’s organizational structure).
92. See Yxta Maya Murray, “FEMA Has Been A Nightmare:” Epistemic Injustice in Puerto
Rico, 55 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 321, 325 (2019) (discussing the tolls of Hurricanes Maria and
Katrina).
93. SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO
HURRICANE KATRINA, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, H.R. REP. NO. 109-377, at 2, 13 (2d Sess. 2006)
(emphasizing testimony that requested funding to implement necessary steps was denied and
admitting that levees were not built to withstand the most severe hurricanes); see also infra
Section II.B.
94. H.R. REP. NO. 109-377, supra note 93, at 2, 13.
95. See supra Section I.A (discussing the organizational psychology of crisis management).
96. FEMA Simulation Comm. Hearing, supra note 59, at 1, 3 (statement of Susan M. Collins,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affs.).
97. Id. at 2, 17.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 17.
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donated by Walmart even as many residents struggled to obtain clean
water and did not allow the Coast Guard to deliver one thousand gallons
of fuel, which was in short supply. 100 After arriving, firefighters spent
days waiting in their hotels rather than rescuing people. 101
These deficiencies were rooted in the absence of a detailed
FEMA hurricane response plan in advance, which meant that the
agency needed to devote precious time during the crisis to developing
operating procedures. 102 The Governor of Louisiana summed up his
experience in dealing with FEMA at the time by noting, “We wanted
soldiers, helicopters, food and water . . . . They wanted to negotiate an
organizational chart.” 103
Hurricane Katrina lives in U.S. history as one of the costliest
and deadliest natural disasters, from which New Orleans still has not
economically recovered fifteen years later. 104 The FEMA simulation had
uncovered many of these problems, but missed others because of the
agency’s decision to reduce the scenarios considered. 105 Regardless, the
delays in completing the exercise meant that the simulation’s final
report did not arrive sufficiently in advance to make meaningful
organizational changes that might have lessened the decimation. 106
3. The Financial System
After the economy teetered on the edge of a cliff in 2008, with
the Dow Jones Industrial Average down by over fifty percent, U.S.
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner announced that the first step to
prevent another crisis would be requiring “banking institutions to go
through a carefully designed comprehensive stress test, to use the
medical term.” 107 The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 mandated that a
“systemically important financial institution”—an entity whose
100. Scott Shane, Eric Lipton & Christopher Drew, After Failures, Government Officials Play
Blame
Game,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
5,
2005),
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/05/us/nationalspecial/after-failures-government-officials-playblame-game.html [https://perma.cc/P2UM-Y57H].
101. Greg Bluestein, Hundreds of Firefighters Stuck at Georgia Hotel for Days Awaiting
Orders, Lincoln J. Star (Sept. 7, 2005), https://journalstar.com/special-section/news/hundreds-offirefighters-stuck-at-georgia-hotel-for-days-awaiting-orders/article_8db0b5a5-d7ff-501b-9f695168c4cb55ff.html [https://perma.cc/K9UW-PLKT].
102. See generally David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375, 1451–53
(2011) (explaining FEMA’s planning delays).
103. See Shane et al., supra note 100 (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. Id.
105. See infra Section I.C.
106. FEMA Simulation Comm. Hearing, supra note 59, at 2.
107. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Secretary Geithner Introduces Financial
Stability
Plan
(Feb.
10,
2009),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/tg18.aspx [https://perma.cc/H9LE-QSHC].
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collapse would endanger the economy, like a big bank—undertake
annual stress tests supervised by a regulator. 108 These tests create
fictitious simulations to help regulators understand how financial
institutions “will respond to severe, yet plausible, stressed market
conditions such as low economic output, high unemployment, [and]
stock market crashes.” 109 The goal is not to punish the bank for
failing. 110 Instead, the regulator might require a bank that failed the
test to take preventive steps, such as lowering its risky debt. 111
The Federal Reserve is the primary supervisor of those tests and
conducts some stress tests of banks on its own. 112 The focal point is a
computer simulation of how a bank’s balance sheet would respond to
various circumstances, such as a deep recession that drives
unemployment up to thirteen percent and cuts the stock market’s value
in half. 113 Most importantly, they determine whether the bank would
have sufficient funds to continue operations. Banks have consistently
passed these exercises in recent years, giving observers greater
confidence in the financial system’s resilience during the COVID-19
downturn. 114 Stress tests are seen as an “indispensable tool of any
systematic effort to reduce the likelihood and impact of crisis events.” 115
Precautionary measures are crucial because a single large bank
failure can spark a chain reaction that brings down the entire
economy. 116 Just as doctors probe hearts to prevent medical
108. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 § 165(i), Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1430 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365) (requiring stress tests for bank holding
companies with over $10 billion in assets). For decades, stress tests existed in finance, mostly
under the internal control of banks. See, e.g., MICHEL CROUHY, DAN GALAI & ROBERT MARK, RISK
MANAGEMENT 232–40 (2001) (describing the use of stress tests).
109. Weber, supra note 43, at 833 (mentioning also liquidity shortages, high default rates, and
failures of large counterparties).
110. Id.
111. MICHAEL S. BARR, HOWELL E. JACKSON & MARGARET E. TAHYAR, FINANCIAL REGULATION:
LAW AND POLICY 189, 265 (2016).
112. Id.
113. Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Speech at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Annual Risk Conference: Developing Tools for Dynamic Capital
Supervision
(Apr.
10,
2012),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20120410a.htm
[https://perma.cc/8UHC-M7PH].
114. See, e.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., DODD-FRANK ACT STRESS TEST 2019:
SUPERVISORY
STRESS
TEST
RESULTS
(June
2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2019-dfast-results-20190621.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S3BR-LD33]; Neil Irwin, Something Weird Is Happening on Wall Street, and Not
TIMES
(Mar.
12,
2020),
Just
the
Stock
Sell-Off,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/12/upshot/markets-weird-coronavirus.html
[https://perma.cc/A5YJ-QEMR] (expressing greater confidence).
115. Giovanni Carosio, Foreword to STRESS-TESTING THE BANKING SYSTEM, at xxi (Mario
Quagliariello ed., 2009).
116. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 193 (2008).
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emergencies and deaths, so must regulators probe vital financial
institutions to prevent the economy from collapsing.
Stress tests are necessary because triggers for financial
instability have repeatedly caught regulators unaware in recent
decades. The most recent example is the 2007 mortgage crisis, in which
U.S. financial institutions aggressively extended loans to home buyers,
too often deceiving low-income applicants. 117 Many borrowers and
lenders were also overly optimistic because they assumed housing
prices would continue to rise. 118 By 2008, housing prices began to fall
and borrowers became increasingly unable to pay their mortgages,
resulting in mass defaults and over five million people losing their
homes. 119 Some banks had extended many mortgages that would not be
repaid and the banks were also exposed to highly leveraged mortgagebacked securities—an investment device that gambled on people’s
ability to pay back their mortgages. 120
Regulators missed this threat despite the fact that one of their
core jobs is to ensure that banks do not have too much risky debt, and
to that end they routinely examine banks’ records. 121 Indeed, a team of
regulators called “resident inspectors” is on-site year-round at the
largest banks combing through their activities to ensure compliance
with the law. 122 Although regulators knew that banks depended on
mortgages as safe and reliable debt instruments before 2008, examiners
failed to realize that much of that debt was at risk of not being repaid. 123
While the full causes of the subsequent financial collapse and recession
are still debated, the mortgage crisis contributed substantially. 124
As another example, when the 2006 avian flu surge in Asia
stoked worldwide alarm, an interagency group of U.S. financial
regulators instructed banks to include pandemics in their
operational plans. 125 However, because the outbreak was ultimately
milder than originally thought, the psychology of near misses made
it unlikely that regulators would increase their concern about
117. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Markets, Systemic Risk, and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 61
SMU L. REV. 209, 210 (2008).
118. See Patricia A. McCoy & Susan M. Wachter, Why the Ability-to-Repay Rule is Vital to
Financial Stability, 108 GEO. L.J. 649, 652 (2020).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Van Loo, supra note 45, at 404, 427 (summarizing financial regulatory
examination of banks).
122. Id. at 412.
123. See id. at 371–72.
124. See id. at 395.
125. See FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, INTERAGENCY STATEMENT ON PANDEMIC
PLANNING 5 (2020), https://www.ffiec.gov/press/pandemicguidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SSZX489].
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pandemics. Moreover, as predicted by the availability heuristic,
pandemics had faded into the background of agency concerns by the
time COVID-19 arrived fourteen years later. 126
As a result, financial regulators were slow to act during the
COVID-19 crisis. By late January 2020, the World Health Organization
had declared an international public health emergency, 127 President
Trump had begun to restrict travel from China, 128 and the Secretary
of Commerce wrote a memo warning that the virus could cost the
United States trillions of dollars and endanger millions of Americans’
lives. 129 Yet financial regulators waited until March 6, a week after a
stock market wiped out over three trillion dollars in value, to push
banks to “update” their pandemic operational plans. 130 That update
was the first in over a decade, and called for considering the risks of
how to continue operations remotely or with forty percent bank-worker
absenteeism, and how to reassess instability risks. 131
Financial regulators’ long inattention to pandemics means that
the financial system was not tested for the kind of economic shutdown
caused by COVID-19, and as a result regulators were largely in the dark
about how financial institutions would fare. 132 Fortunately, since the
resulting recession wound up being short-lived, the lack of financial
regulation preparation did not have severe consequences.
Financial regulators have a particularly difficult prediction task.
Whereas pandemics will originate within a public health regulator’s
field of expertise, the catalyst for a financial crisis may lie outside
finance—coming from housing, health, or political unrest. Nonetheless,
it is concerning that the potential triggers of financial upheaval have
consistently surprised regulators even when regulators directly
oversaw the products and institutions (such as mortgages and banks)
that ultimately caused the collapse. 133 Despite the most extensive
126. See Section I.A (discussing the psychology of near misses and availability).
127. Press Briefing, World Health Org. [WHO], Coronavirus Emergency Committee Second
Meeting (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/transcripts/ihremergency-committee-for-pneumonia-due-to-the-novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov-press-briefingtranscript-30012020.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DK7-MSY6] (providing transcript).
128. Proclamation No. 9984, 85 Fed. Reg. 6709 (Jan. 31, 2020).
129. Maggie Haberman, Trade Adviser Warned White House in January of Risks of a
Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/us/politics/navarro-warning-trumpcoronavirus.html (last updated Mar. 31, 2021) [https://perma.cc/D4WZ-P3KY].
130. FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 125, at 1.
131. Id. at 6.
132. See infra Section II.C (discussing limits of financial regulators’ planning).
133. Consider, for example, how law professors Kathleen Engel and Patricia McCoy spoke of
the mortgage crisis several years before the financial crisis—at a time when it was still possible to
prevent much of the devastation that resulted. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale
of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1257–59
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adoption of external stress tests in these three case studies, financial
regulators have yet to show that they are ready for “the complexities of
modern financial markets and investment securities” that present
“perhaps the greatest financial-market challenge of the future.” 134
C. Existing Stress Test Limitations
Even with their identifiable flaws and subsequent
administrative shortcomings, it is still possible that stress tests are
helping to prevent even worse results. Additionally, there is a risk of
hindsight bias in assessing the response to stress tests. Given limited
resources, agency leaders cannot prepare for all conceivable threats.
Nonetheless, the above case studies indicate that as currently
implemented stress tests have several potentially significant
limitations worth examining further: voluntariness, confidentiality, a
lack of imagination, and the absence of comprehensive evaluation.
First, stress tests of administrative agencies are voluntary.
Lawmakers have only imposed stress tests on private-sector entities,
most notably banks. The Federal Reserve is under no obligation to
simulate the regulatory decisions it would make in the face of big bank
failures, a depression, or other financial shocks. 135
Although HHS compels many state and local health care entities
to complete a surge capacity hospital readiness exercise, no law
demands something similar of HHS or FEMA. 136 HHS voluntarily
initiated its Crimson Contagion exercise without any congressional
oversight or mandate. 137 Similarly, although the CDC participated in
Crimson Contagion, it is not obligated to undergo any pandemic
simulation of its own.
(2002) (discussing the predatory tactics of subprime mortgage lenders and proposing that a “duty
of suitability” be imposed on such lenders to incentivize efficient markets).
134. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV.
211, 211 (2009).
135. Instead, the Federal Reserve views the stress tests of banks as a test of its own
performance. See Randal K. Quarles, Vice Chair for Supervision, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv.
Sys., Remarks at a Research Conference Sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston: Stress
Testing:
A
Discussion
and
Review
(July
9,
2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/quarles20190709a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M7UY-MPWT].
136. See HHS PERFORMANCE MEASURES, supra note 60, at 32–33 (explaining the voluntary
nature of the tests). A recent proposal would expand stress testing of hospitals. See Barak D.
Richman & Steven L. Schwarcz, Macromedial Regulation, 82 OHIO ST. L.J. 727, 743 (2021).
137. See Flu Season: U.S. Public Health Preparedness and Response: Written Testimony Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Com., 116th Cong. 8–9
(2019) (statement of Robert Kadlec, Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, United
States Department of Health and Human Services) (describing the breadth of the Crimson
Contagion 2019 Functional Exercise).
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The voluntary nature of the exercises can have consequences.
For example, FEMA was free to follow any timetable it wanted in
conducting its Louisiana hurricane simulation, unlike the mandatory
annual stress tests of banks. The five-year delay proved costly, as
necessary planning documents were not “generated before they were so
urgently needed” for Katrina. 138 Moreover, the voluntary nature means
that agency heads typically opt out of participating, leaving the
exercises instead for midlevel or frontline employees. 139 This makes it
less likely that organizational change will result.
Second, the public and sometimes Congress lack visibility into
stress tests. Regulators usually do not publicly release the results. HHS
kept the preliminary findings of Crimson Contagion nonpublic until an
internal draft document, marked “DO NOT DISTRIBUTE,” was leaked
to the press during the COVID-19 pandemic. 140 The results of FEMA’s
hurricane exercise also remained private. 141 This secrecy can
undermine accountability and makes it less likely public concern will
pressure an agency to learn from the test’s findings.
Third, as one would expect based on the psychological
literature, 142 there is sometimes an imagination deficit in predicting the
nature or scale of the next crisis. For example, Crimson Contagion did
not consider whether agencies were positioned to ramp up nationwide
virus testing, thus missing an actionable issue that could have
dramatically mitigated the COVID-19 pandemic early on. 143
Even in financial regulation, where stress tests have a longer
track record and were designed to be forward looking, agencies have
mostly used them to ensure banks can withstand a recurrence of prior
shocks. For instance, stress tests now consider banks’ mortgage
exposure and ability to withstand something like the recession of
2008. 144 However, financial regulators never implemented pandemic
economic shocks into their tests, despite a parade of near misses in
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (2002), bird flu (2006), swine flu
(2009), and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (2012). 145
138. FEMA Simulation Comm. Hearing, supra note 59, at 2.
139. See, e.g., id. at 20 (“[T]he effectiveness of the [hurricane simulation] was greatly
diminished by the poor attendance of key decisionmakers . . . .”).
140. Sanger et al., supra note 67.
141. See FEMA Simulation Comm. Hearing, supra note 59, at 1–2.
142. See supra Section I.A.
143. See HHS PANDEMIC SIMULATION DRAFT REP., supra note 68 (failing to mention CDC
testing).
144. See Tarullo, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Annual Risk Conference,
supra note 113.
145. See Margo A. Bagley, The Morality of Compulsory Licensing as an Access to Medicines
Tool, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2463, 2492 n.122 (2018) (listing the string of health challenges); Min Joo
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Indeed, when the Federal Reserve released its stress test
hypotheticals in February of 2020, even after the globe was on notice
that COVID-19 had begun to ravage Wuhan, China, at an alarming
rate, the “severely adverse scenario” did not reference a pandemic. 146
Moreover, some of those announced parameters were overly
optimistic. The Federal Reserve assumed in its worst-case scenario
that unemployment would rise to six percent, whereas during the
COVID-19 crisis it surpassed fourteen percent; and its stress test
assumed a drop in GDP of about ten percent whereas the actual drop
was greater than thirty percent. 147
Financial regulators’ backward-looking stress tests target the
availability heuristic for emergencies that tend to repeat themselves in
similar forms—which is extremely valuable and may have prevented
many financial crashes that would have otherwise occurred in similar
forms. 148 However, this approach is less relevant to disruptions that
may come in new forms or vary greatly in severity. That is particularly
concerning because observers have long recognized that the “trigger to
the next crisis will not be the same as the trigger to the last one—but
there will be another crisis.” 149
A final limitation is that even when simulations are predictive,
they often fail to evaluate the organization. To encourage agency
leaders to effect organizational change, or for Congress to allocate more
resources, stress tests would need to produce realistic assessments of
unpreparedness. Yet candid evaluations are in tension with agency
leaders’ preference for “an absence of criticism” that puts their pride,
jobs, and funding at risk. 150 In 2009, Saturday Night Live hit on that
Kim & Simon Denyer, South Korea Is Doing 10,000 Coronavirus Tests a Day. The U.S. Is
Struggling for Even a Small Fraction of That., WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/coronavirus-test-kits-south-koreaus/2020/03/13/007f14fc-64a1-11ea-8a8e-5c5336b32760_story.html
[https://perma.cc/WR8LXCQB] (referencing prior outbreaks).
146. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., 2020 SUPERVISORY SCENARIOS FOR ANNUAL
STRESS TESTS REQUIRED UNDER THE DODD-FRANK ACT STRESS TESTING RULES AND THE CAPITAL
PLAN
RULE
3
(Feb.
2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/bcreg20200206a1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V2WU-JWPU].
147. Id. at 4; Harriet Torry, U.S. Economy Contracted at Record Rate Last Quarter; Jobless
Claims Rise to 1.43 Million, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/us-economy-gdp-reportsecond-quarter-coronavirus-11596061406 (last updated July 30, 2020, 3:21 PM)
[https://perma.cc/U7KW-WP8M].
148. See supra Section I.A (summarizing the psychology of crises).
149. Karma
Allen,
Dimon:
Another
Crisis
Is
Inevitable,
CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/04/08/dimon-defends-jpmorgans-size-breadth.html (last updated Apr.
9, 2015, 9:08 AM) [https://perma.cc/ET2G-MZKQ] (internal quotation marks omitted).
150. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO
IT 197 (1989) (“The head of a public agency is judged and rewarded on the basis of the appearance
of success, when success can mean reputation, influence, charm, the absence of criticism, personal
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tension and showed that stress tests are not too arcane for reputational
damage to financial regulation leaders. Its skit depicted Secretary
Geithner explaining that he had decided against using a 1 to 100 grade
for stress tests and would instead use a “PASS/PASS system” to be “less
judgmental.” 151
Agencies’ desires to minimize negative perception may explain
why FEMA and HHS designed the Louisiana Hurricane and Crimson
Contagion exercises as nonevaluative tests. 152 Even though those
agencies largely kept the exercises’ existence secret, the hundreds of
outside participants made complete confidentiality within the
government impossible. 153 Any final report harshly judging agencies
risks being leaked to the public or obtained through the Freedom of
Information Act 154 and would make it more difficult for agency heads to
exaggerate their self-assessments in their annual reports. Even wellintended agency officials might prefer to conduct the exercises in a less
evaluative manner, with the hope of learning something without
creating political headwinds. 155
In particular, stress tests tend to lack evaluation that would
communicate the big-picture implications of failure—in other words,
the full consequences. For instance, neither the FEMA hurricane nor
the HHS pandemic simulations told participants how many lives or
billions of dollars they could have saved with better judgment or
preparation. 156 Rather than an output, harm was a fixed input in the
exercises—asking what the CDC would do to combat a rapidly rising

ideology, or victory in policy debates.”); see also Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7, 11 (2000) (“Congress can increase or decrease an agency’s budget, depending
in part on Congress’ assessment of the agency’s performance.”).
151. Saturday Night Live, Geithner Cold Open: Bank Stress Test, YOUTUBE (Oct. 3, 2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CERiQe9PbKs [https://perma.cc/KLR4-EQPT] (“[W]e decided
that that might unfairly stigmatize banks who scored low on the test because they followed
reckless lending practices or were otherwise not good at banking.”). Bank failures would
potentially reflect poorly on the regulators themselves, which means that a lenient system for
banks could shield regulators from scrutiny of the test results—of course, only if that leniency is
not itself criticized. For a discussion of such perceptions in bank stress tests, see Baradaran, supra
note 9, at 1297.
152. FEMA Simulation Comm. Hearing, supra note 59, at 11. There is no evidence that HHS
even produced a final report. Sanger et al., supra note 67.
153. See, e.g., FEMA Simulation Comm. Hearing, supra note 59, at 2 (noting that the
Hurricane Pam exercise involved at least three hundred emergency response officials from local,
state, and federal governments).
154. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (detailing what agencies are required to make public).
155. Cf. Kristin N. Johnson, Macroprudential Regulation: A Sustainable Approach to
Regulating Financial Markets, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 881, 901 (“[I]intentional manipulation can
undermine the value of these quantitative models.”).
156. HHS PANDEMIC SIMULATION DRAFT REP., supra note 68; FEMA Simulation Comm.
Hearing, supra note 59.
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count of 110 million Americans infected within a few months. 157 With
human suffering held constant, the payoff in terms of lives saved for an
agency acting on stress test lessons is less clear.
*

*

*

In sum, even when they participate in stress tests,
administrative agencies sometimes fail to take clear steps that could
prevent or mitigate catastrophes. Often the failure is not due to any
absence of authority or resources but to something entirely in their
discretion. Agencies have missed key issues in advance, such as risky
mortgages or inadequate virus testing; allowed coordination challenges
to slow important decisions; and neglected to create emergency plans.
These case studies of societal challenges from public health, the
environment, and finance do not exhaust the law’s shortcomings in
preparing for potentially acute threats to societal well-being. Stress
tests complement other strategies for disaster responses, such as
regulatory monitoring. Thus, flawless stress tests would by no means
be sufficient by themselves. Stress tests are, however, an
underappreciated tool deployed to push an organization toward
resilience.
In theory, the pervasiveness of stress tests is a promising
development for counteracting psychological tendencies to
underprepare for rare events. But as currently utilized, key stress tests
are secretive, unimaginative, voluntary, and inconsequential. As a
result, agency leaders will often face predictable, time-sensitive
decisions for the first time during an actual emergency, with inadequate
plans in place.
II. REDESIGNING STRESS TESTS
It would be unrealistic to expect any government to be fully
prepared for all future contingencies. However, since stress tests are
already part of the playbook, agencies could at least conduct them as
effectively as possible. This Part explores four ways to improve the use
of stress tests: legal mandates, external oversight, imaginative inputs,
and consequential outputs. 158 Since three of these are within
administrative discretion, agency heads or the President can

157. HHS PANDEMIC SIMULATION DRAFT REP., supra note 68.
158. This list is not exhaustive and aims to sketch initial priorities for a necessarily larger
governmental transformation.
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significantly reform the state’s crisis responsiveness without legislative
action. 159
A caveat is in order. The costs of any change to stress tests
explored below must be weighed against the benefits—even if the costs
are limited to information management or diversion of current
employees’ attention from other matters. That cost-benefit analysis is
important and the discussion below aims to inform such an analysis.
But providing answers to the cost-benefit analysis is not the focus here.
Instead, the goal is to unearth the array of potential design
improvements for stress tests.
Although these design improvements would need to be subjected
to a cost-benefit analysis, many of the ideas discussed below are
relatively inexpensive given that stress tests already happen, which
means that many design improvements are possible through a
reallocation of existing expenditures. Moreover, any increase in stress
test costs must be viewed in the context of the already large-scale
expenditures devoted to risk management in administrative agencies
and private firms. 160 Assuming considerable expenditures for crisis
administration will continue, the question of how much to invest in
improving stress tests is dependent on comparing indeterminate costbenefit analyses of the various risk management tools available. To
make that comparison rigorously, it would be ideal to understand what
stress tests have to offer if designed well.
A. Mandates for Agency and Business Leaders
Despite limitations, conducting stress tests is considered a best
practice for organizations involved in high-stakes risks. 161 Some private
stakeholders have recognized this value without the law pushing them
to do so. For instance, a growing number of businesses hire outside
cybersecurity firms to try to breach their defenses through any means
possible, including technical hacking, cold-calling employees to obtain

159. On the considerable discretion agencies possess in implementing laws, see, for example,
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 838 (1985) (finding that the decision not to take enforcement
action or institute investigative proceedings is “committed to agency discretion” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). See also Urska Velikonja, Accountability for Nonenforcement, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1549, 1549 (2018) (discussing Supreme Court precedent that “affords
agencies considerable enforcement discretion”).
160. Cf. Maxwell C. Smith, Anita Ghosh & Catherine E. Kanatas, Death v. Taxes: Agency
Approaches to Setting Safety Goals Using Risk Management in an Evolving Legal Environment,
26 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 41, 82 (2017) (“[O]ver the past few decades, agencies have heavily invested
time and resources in enhancing their risk management.”).
161. Cf. Weber, supra note 9, at 2241 (“Conceptualizing stress testing regulation as a corporate
governance matter makes sense.”).
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passwords, and delivering pizza to infiltrate company premises. 162
These cybersecurity exercises involve employees walking through the
steps they would take in response to such assaults. 163
A recognition of those organizational best practices helps explain
lawmakers’ statutory insistence on financial regulation simulations, as
“enforced, mandatory deliberation on stress and failure might serve as
a partial antidote to the tendencies of corporate decision makers,
whether individual or group-level, to overuse heuristics in dangerous
ways.” 164 The availability heuristic and other psychological limits are
thus a core justification for imposing stress tests on the private
sector. 165
Government leaders are not immune to such errors. Nor are
business leaders in sectors other than banking. Just as banks are not
trusted to take adequate precautions on their own, leaders of agencies
and other businesses should not have such discretion when the
consequences are great and their track records poor.
Therefore, where stress tests of agencies’ emergency readiness
are beneficial, Congress should mandate them. They should also
consider what other types of businesses, such as offshore oil and tech
companies, might benefit from similar mandates. Given institutional
limits, Congress may want to delegate much of the authority to decide
what stress tests should be mandated. A meta-agency might oversee
stress tests across agencies. 166 A more embedded model would be to task
a staff member or group inside the agency with focusing on stress tests.
Accompanied by the type of design improvements discussed in
subsequent sections, mandates would help improve the chances that
the extensive resources currently devoted to stress tests are deployed
effectively, rather than in ways that insulate agencies from
reputational damage. 167 Deciding where stress tests would be
appropriate is a difficult task requiring policymakers to weigh
162. See, e.g., The Cyber Security Stress Test, F-SECURE, https://campaigns.f-secure.com/cybersecurity-stress-test/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2022) [https://perma.cc/U7EA-MFUL]; Cybersecurity
Stress-Testing: Don’t Stress About Your Company’s Safety, AXIOM CYBER SOLS.,
https://axiomcyber.com/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-stress-testing-dont-stress-about-yourcompanys-safety/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2022) [https://perma.cc/75J5-QBJ9].
163. See generally sources cited supra note 162.
164. Weber, supra note 9, at 2242.
165. See id. (“[R]egulators should understand their task as involving management-based
regulation—a regulatory approach that acts on corporate planning processes . . . .”).
166. See infra Section II.B.
167. In some contexts, agencies do have some incentives to design stress tests in ways that
would increase funding, meaning that they would not want to make it seem as though the agency
has everything under control. However, reputational management is a powerful driver of
administrative behavior, and self-serving stress tests could always make it seem as though the
problem is inadequate resources while avoiding any assumption of responsibility.
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alternatives and multiple risks in deciding on the optimal level of
precaution. 168 Agencies that both already invest considerable resources
in crisis management and have unsatisfactory track records of
preparedness are leading candidates for considering such mandates.
Agencies could still go beyond these legislative directives to
create additional tests that Congress may not have foreseen. But to
avoid the delays that have undermined past agency exercises, Congress
should include in any mandate a requirement that the tests occur on a
periodic basis, depending on the agency and nature of the potential
crisis.
Each test would seek to answer different questions, mostly
chosen by the agency, Congress, and other external stakeholders. 169 Is
the Federal Reserve prepared to handle financial instability driven by
the shadow banking system even though it cannot directly regulate key
actors such as Venmo, Credit Karma, Mint, and cryptocurrency firms?
Is FEMA ready to coordinate evacuation and cleanup in the face of an
unprecedented storm or toxic spill carried nationwide through the air?
How would the CDC and FDA accelerate virus screening for the next
pandemic?
To explore these questions, it would sometimes be necessary to
design stress tests at the cross-agency and department level, as was the
case for Crimson Contagion. Yet the key sites of decisionmaking are
often in agencies within agencies. 170 For example, HHS oversees eleven
agencies, including visible ones such as the CDC, National Institute of
Health (“NIH”), and FDA, as well as the lesser known Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (“ASPR”). 171 The

168. Cf. Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution in a Multirisk World, in HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL
RISK ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1509, 1526 (Dennis J. Paustenbach ed., 2002)
(discussing the challenge of managing multiple risks and observing “the goal should be not
maximum precaution but an ‘optimal precaution’ that addresses both the risks of inaction and the
risks of action”).
169. See infra Section II.B (discussing external oversight).
170. The Administrative Procedure Act defines agencies to include larger authorities that have
agencies within them. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (“ ‘[A]gency’ means each authority of the Government of
the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency . . . .”).
171. HHS Agencies & Offices, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/hhs-agencies-and-offices/index.html (last updated Oct. 27,
2015) [https://perma.cc/W9G8-HYZ4]. The ASPR oversees the Biomedical Advanced Research and
Development Authority, whose mission includes developing, manufacturing, and distributing
vaccines and other medical countermeasures in the event of a public health emergency. BARDA
Strategic Plan 2011-2016, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. 5 (2011),
https://www.phe.gov/about/barda/Documents/barda-strategic-plan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HE97YKXJ] (listing other goals that include responding to chemical, biological, radiation, and nuclear
attacks).
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CDC, NIH, and FDA are among the largest federal agencies, each with
over ten thousand employees. 172
Each crucial senior management team must know what it needs
to do to prepare for a crisis. 173 Consequently, a single stress test of the
sprawling HHS alone cannot adequately prepare so many diverse
entities for a pandemic. Moreover, since the law often mandates that
businesses assume regulatory roles, 174 in such contexts those firms may
be conceptualized as analogous to agencies within agencies for purposes
of possibly mandating stress tests.
Not all agencies will need legal mandates. Some federal entities,
such as the military, may already have proper incentives to regularly
run robust simulations. 175 For others with less crisis-oriented missions,
stress tests seem potentially inappropriate. It is not immediately clear,
for instance, how the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
could stress test its ability to prosecute workplace discrimination, or
why the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) would need to adopt the
practice for its consumer protection, privacy, and antitrust
enforcement. 176
On the other hand, stress tests—or something like them—could
be imagined for the FTC if stress tests were not defined as only
appropriate for threats that arrive suddenly or impose harm quickly.
By relaxing this limiting principle of speed, it becomes more possible to
envision simulations like those currently used by crisis agencies also
helping the FTC get ahead of big problems within its regulatory
mandate. According to some scholars, the agency failed to get ahead of
widespread privacy violations, and “[l]oss of control over personal
information creates a variety of near-term and longer-term risks that

172. Federal
Workforce
Data,
U.S.
OFF.
OF
PERS.
MGMT.,
https://www.fedscope.opm.gov/employment.asp
(last
visited
Feb.
17,
2022)
[https://perma.cc/SH5Q-CPKX] (providing official employment figures for federal agencies and
classifying the FDA and CDC as “large”).
173. Cf. Thomas H. Stanton, The Growing Movement for Enterprise Risk Management in
Government: The United States Begins To Catch Up, 37 ASIA PAC. J. PUB. ADMIN. 182, 185 (2015)
(“In the US federal government, the agency rather than the department is often the optimal level
for [enterprise risk management].”).
174. See, e.g., Rory Van Loo, The New Gatekeepers: Private Firms as Public Enforcers, 106 VA.
L. REV. 467 (2020) (using case studies from the oil, technology, pharmaceutical, and banking
industries to show how firms are increasingly conscripted to enforce the law against other firms).
175. Academics tend to offer the military as an example of simulation best practices. See
Baradaran, supra note 9, at 1319 (arguing that financial regulators should adopt wargame
practices from the military); James A. “Sandy” Winnefeld, Jr., Christopher Kirchhoff & David M.
Upton, Cybersecurity’s Human Factor: Lessons from the Pentagon, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2015, at
215 (summarizing the military’s widespread use of war games). Nonetheless, an institution whose
performance sets the standard is not beyond opportunity for improvement.
176. On the FTC’s authority in these areas, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58.
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are difficult to understand and value.” 177 Most prominently, the sharing
of social network data without permission allowed third parties such as
Cambridge Analytica to attempt to steer the 2016 election toward thencandidate Donald Trump. 178 According to other critics, the FTC has also
failed to grasp the implications of allowing the five biggest tech firms to
purchase over four hundred companies, including Facebook buying
Instagram and WhatsApp, and Google acquiring Double-Click,
YouTube, and Waze. 179 The failure to block harmful mergers, combined
with price increases due to manipulation or deception, could contribute
to economic inequality on a large scale. 180
Thus, it is not inconceivable that role-playing a doomsday
simulation related to privacy, election misinformation, or economic
inequality could help the FTC understand the full societal implications
of unfettered data access and unchecked acquisitions in the tech sector.
The FTC could thereby assess what actions now and later would be
appropriate under varying sets of assumptions. Or the FTC might
require stress tests of certain companies, such as platforms, to ensure
that those firms are adequately prepared for potential dire
consequences of their operations. 181
Although such simulations would stretch the concept of stress
tests beyond their common understanding, what to call such exercises
is less important than determining whether they would improve
governance. This Article seeks to encourage conversations about the
scope and role of stress tests—and their cognates—rather than to
provide an exhaustive list or typology of agencies’ suitability. The right
answer will surely be context specific, and in agencies such as the FTC,
it may look less like a stress test and more like threat modeling. Yet it
would be premature to dismiss outright the possibility of tailoring
stress tests for noncrisis agencies.
177. Cohen, supra note 17, at 377.
178. See, e.g., Philip M. Napoli, What If More Speech Is No Longer the Solution? First
Amendment Theory Meets Fake News and the Filter Bubble, 70 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 55, 75–76
(2018) (exploring the free-speech implications of data sharing).
179. See, e.g., TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 132–33
(2018) (advocating the dissolution of big tech companies); C. Scott Hemphill, Disruptive
Incumbents: Platform Competition in an Age of Machine Learning, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 1987–
88 (2019) (highlighting the competitive threat that Instagram posed to Facebook before the
acquisition); Astead W. Herndon, Elizabeth Warren Proposes Breaking up Tech Giants Like
TIMES
(Mar.
8,
2019),
Amazon
and
Facebook,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/08/us/politics/elizabeth-warren-amazon.html
[https://perma.cc/9KXE-QG92] (summarizing the plans by Elizabeth Warren, Bernie Sanders, and
others to break up big tech companies).
180. See Rory Van Loo, Broadening Consumer Law: Competition, Protection, and Distribution,
95 NOTRE DAME L. Rev. 211 (2019) (positing that antitrust and consumer protection could combine
to play a significant role in lowering income inequality).
181. This topic is explored further infra Part III.
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Ensuring that mandated stress tests result in action will be
difficult, and the following sections turn to that task. But without a
mandate, valuable stress tests may not occur at all, or may happen too
infrequently or inadequately to be useful.
B. External Oversight
Simply conducting stress tests is not enough. The law would
ideally also increase the chances that agencies act on the lessons
learned from stress tests when it would be overall beneficial to do so.
One strategy is to involve external stakeholders in all phases. This
involvement can combine visibility, input, and supervision.
To increase accountability, mandated stress tests should involve
some external actor outside the agency. At a minimum, agencies could
brief Congress and the White House on the results of the most
important simulations and provide subsequent updates on progress
towards resolving shortcomings. But Congress has limited attention
and resources and cannot engage in the design details or even summary
results from all agency stress tests. Additionally, underperforming
executive agencies can reflect poorly on the president. Consequently,
the White House also has incentives to produce self-serving
evaluations. Nonetheless, requiring that key stress test results be sent
to the president makes sense in some areas, and would align other
agencies with the military’s tendency to update the president on
significant war game results. 182
Governmental actors, such as the Government Accountability
Office (“GAO”), General Services Administration’s Office of Evaluation
Sciences, National Academy of Sciences, Inspector General, or the
Congressional Budget Office could provide additional support and
oversight. One of the most straightforward existing homes for stresstest oversight is the GAO, which has already conducted studies of
different agencies’ enterprise risk management. 183 A new bureau,
whether standalone or within an existing entity, could also focus on
stress tests and risk management oversight of other agencies.

182. See, e.g., Winnefeld et al., supra note 175, at 94 (describing the military’s general
practices for security audits).
183. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-63, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT:
SELECTED AGENCIES’ EXPERIENCES ILLUSTRATE GOOD PRACTICES IN MANAGING RISK 4 (2016)
(interviewing twenty-four agencies on their established enterprise risk management policies). The
GAO’s role would need to abide by separation of power constraints. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986) (ruling on allowable executive powers).
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Concerns about managing widespread alarm speak to a wellknown gap between perceptions by the government and public. 184 That
challenge “puts the regulators in the awkward position of defending
expert risk perceptions as more valid or rational than the public’s.” 185
The greater society’s “confidence/trust in institutions and elites,” the
more likely the populace will defer to established institutions and
laws. 186
However, while some details must be kept confidential,
particularly sensitive information about private actors or intelligence
matters, those justifications for secrecy are less relevant to stress
testing public agencies. Another risk is that too much transparency
with stress tests could pressure agency leaders to prepare excessively
in order to shield themselves from later being criticized. Such risks are
worth factoring into the implementation of transparency into stress
tests.
Those risks must be weighed against the possible benefits of
public transparency allowing society to advocate for its interests and to
hold leaders accountable for their failures. 187 Publicly available stress
tests would allow diverse stakeholders to assess the results, thus
discouraging or weakening self-serving proclamations of success. 188
Indeed, unnecessary secrecy can make the public more prone to panic
and crises harder to manage because people lack faith in leaders and
are therefore less likely to heed public warnings. 189 Moreover, in a real
crisis, agencies would need to deal with heightened public scrutiny, so
transparency could create more realistic simulations by making
officials manage the public.
Thus, agencies would ideally default to releasing the results of
stress tests publicly and assuaging worries by taking appropriate action
or explaining their nonaction. That approach is preferable to agencies
184. See Lori S. Bennear, Economic Analysis, Risk Regulation, and the Dynamics of Policy
Regret, in POLICY SHOCK, supra note 39, at 43, 53 (“[P]ublic perceptions of risk often differ . . . from
expert perceptions of risk . . . .”).
185. Id. at 54.
186. Edward J. Balleisen, Lori S. Bennear, Kimberly D. Krawiec & Jonathan B. Wiener,
Recalibrating Risk: Crises, Learning, and Regulatory Change, in POLICY SHOCK, supra note 39, at
540, 549.
187. See, e.g., Rebecca Bratspies & Sarah Lamdan, Taking a Page from the FDA’s Prescription
Medicine Information Rules: Reimagining Environmental Information for Climate Change, 40 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 573, 583 (2018) (discussing transparency in both the health and
environmental contexts and arguing that “public access to data helps communities make informed
decisions about the chemical hazards in their midst”).
188. See supra Section II.A (discussing the importance of external stakeholders).
189. ROBERT GALFORD & ANNE SEIBOLD DRAPEAU, THE TRUSTED LEADER 210–11 (2002)
(describing how organizations and individuals with low levels of trust lack the resources to fight
threats because “[t]hey lack the ability to engage, or bring out the best in their people”).
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promoting calmness with silence, inaction, and misinformation.
Avoiding panic is more relevant during emergencies than between
them—when most stress tests would occur. During those lulls, alarming
simulation conclusions may be necessary to prompt authorities to
adequately prepare for a future contingency. 190
Although the primary goal would be organizational change,
stress tests can also feed into policymaking. Based on results, agencies
could reallocate existing resources or write relevant rules. In some
instances, agencies would need to ask Congress for either new
legislation or funding to address identified shortcomings. Providing
transparency and oversight for stress tests thus not only reflects good
governance principles, but also can help address irrational inaction.
C. Imaginative Scenarios
Stress tests should be designed by choosing scenarios from a
comprehensive set of predictions. A robust literature has explored ways
for policymaking to incorporate the future in a more effective
manner. 191 Comprehensive predictions will sometimes mean imagining
unlikely scenarios. Imagination can help envision which disasters may
arise and predict what challenges those disasters will pose once they
do. Since people exhibit natural psychological resistance to thinking
about negative topics and inherent bias toward underestimating
unlikely future events, 192 the law has a role to play in forcing
imagination.
Financial regulation scholars are aware of the lack of creativity
in bank stress tests and the resulting need “to normalize (rather than
problematize) unexpected events that might be weak-signal harbingers
of future catastrophe.” 193 If regulators had paid more attention to
scholarly warnings about mortgage markets in the years leading up to
the 2008 financial crisis, 194 or analyzed their data more effectively, they
would not have been so blindsided.
190. The federal government has sometimes begun to act on a recognition of inadequate crisis
preparation in the wake of a near miss, only to eventually lose interest in that project. For example,
the federal government identified a need for a larger stockpile of ventilators thirteen years before
the coronavirus pandemic, and after the contracts fell through, is still waiting to get any
ventilators delivered. Kulish et al., supra note 77. Having a regular stress test could continue to
push those authorities toward action as the near miss fades from memory.
191. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Wiener, Best Cass Scenario, 43 TULSA L. REV. 933, 943 (2008)
(situating the “venerable literature on the development of scenarios” in the context of explaining
“why people envision the future as they do, and how to do better”).
192. Supra Section I.A.1.
193. Weber, supra note 9, at 2242.
194. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 133, at 1366 (warning of systemic failures in mortgage
markets in 2002).
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That creativity deficit also affects other regulatory spheres. For
instance, after terrorists took the unprecedented steps of hijacking
commercial airplanes and crashing them into the World Trade Center
in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., the congressionally
appointed 9/11 Commission recommended “routinizing, even
bureaucratizing, the exercise of imagination” to lessen the chance of
being caught unaware. 195 It bears emphasis that imagination goes not
only to the main trigger, such as a worldwide pandemic, but also to
subsequent details like new variants of the virus that make vaccines
less effective.
Agency heads can encourage imagination through their
leadership. But there are also ways to institutionalize it. As one
example, administrative agencies could create a forecaster, futurist, or
strategist position. Regardless of the name, the job description would
emphasize creating and analyzing contingencies. These strategists’
predictions would serve as the bases for simulations—whether for the
agency itself or the banks, oil companies, and other private entities it
oversees. The strategists would then promote adequate attention
towards those contingencies and advocate for agency action to address
the lessons learned.
The private sector has created leadership roles for similar
purposes. Ford’s Chief Futurist alerts the company’s auto designers to
looming changes like water scarcity, even though she does not have an
automotive background. 196 As another example, Citigroup recently
hired its first Global Head of Emerging Platforms and Services, quickly
dubbed the “Citi Futurist,” to serve as a “visionary strategist” and
develop banking products for mobile apps and wearable devices. 197
Irrespective of the title and specific responsibilities, for these
individuals to have meaningful institutional influence, they must sit
high in the organizational hierarchy. 198 Agencies must also allocate
195. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 344
(2004), http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KF2-4BRT].
196. Christine Bader, Beyond the Chief Sustainability Officer, ATLANTIC (May 20, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/05/other-corporate-social-responsibilityjobs/393677/ [https://perma.cc/3MZ4-U7Z6].
197. Penny Crosman, Citi Futurist Envisions the Part Wearables Will Play in Banking, AM.
BANKER (Jan. 16, 2015, 2:43 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/citi-futurist-envisionsthe-part-wearables-will-play-in-banking [https://perma.cc/3MCY-RNDR] (covering Citigroup’s
new position).
198. Ideally both the department and the sub-agencies would have such roles—for example,
both HHS and the CDC. For further examinations of involving third parties in the regulatory
process, see Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1629,
1630 (2011); and Robert F. Weber, New Governance, Financial Regulation, and Challenges to
Legitimacy: The Example of the Internal Models Approach to Capital Adequacy Regulation, 62
ADMIN. L. REV. 783, 854 (2010).
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sufficient resources to these strategists so they can rigorously research
scenarios, model ideas, and drive necessary organizational
transformations. Research is an essential component of comprehensive
and imaginative predictions because history, other countries’
experiences, and emerging current events indicate what is possible.
Since their analyses should include not only ethical and qualitative
considerations but also economic implications, they would ideally have
a team of cross-functional experts. Ford’s Chief Futurist, for instance,
leads an interdisciplinary “trends team” to study topics like how Japan
and the cell phone industry are responding to aging populations. 199
Some agencies have already received prescient insights from a
related approach: hiring future-oriented consulting firms. Chevron,
Microsoft, Sony, the Department of Defense, the Department of State,
and others have commissioned The Future Today Institute, which
“researches, models and prototypes future risk and opportunity.” 200 In
2014, HHS, the CDC, and other public health agencies engaged the
Institute for Alternative Futures in crafting a report imagining the
public health system in 2030. 201 To illustrate how imaginative these
groups can be, the institute’s staff, who have titles such as “Senior
Futurist,” produced four scenarios and held a national workshop in
which agency participants rated each scenario’s likelihood and
developed relevant strategies. 202 The scenario rated as second most
likely—having a fifty percent chance of occurring—included public
health agencies mishandling a 2020 flu pandemic so badly that a hostile
political climate subsequently led to health care funding cuts and
greater health inequality. 203
Similarly, FEMA hired a private contractor, Innovative
Emergency Management, that simulated “with eerie accuracy the alltoo-real problems of Katrina.” 204 The contractor wrote the scenario with
the storm leaving 1.1 million people homeless, producing twenty inches

199. Bader, supra note 196.
TODAY
INST.,
200. About
The
Future
Today
Institute,
FUTURE
https://futuretodayinstitute.com/about/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2022) [https://perma.cc/285L-L6QB].
201. INST. FOR ALT. FUTURES, PUBLIC HEALTH 2030: A SCENARIO EXPLORATION 54 (2014),
https://wayback.archive-it.org/13466/20200205000421/https://altfutures.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/04/IAF-PublicHealth2030Scenarios.pdf [https://perma.cc/D77Q-XVYY].
202. Id. at 39 (explaining that workshop participants “stepped into” the scenarios to develop
strategies).
203. Id. at 12–17, 39. The most likely scenario, rated as sixty-two percent likely to occur,
imagined that “public health agencies and health care slowly advance their capabilities” but
considerable “variations in technological capabilities, funding, and approaches to prevention—
along with a continuous rise in health care costs—significantly limit public health gains.” Id. at 6,
39.
204. FEMA Simulation Comm. Hearing, supra note 59, at 2, 15.
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of rain, and flooding or shutting down fifty-seven chemical plants. 205
Just one year later, real-life Katrina left one million people homeless,
produced eighteen inches of rain, and flooded or shut down over fifty
plants. 206 More importantly, the forecasters identified the array of
issues that government officials would face. 207 However, FEMA reduced
funding after the multi-month simulation had begun, eliminating what
became one of the most accurate hypotheticals requiring a solution:
How should authorities respond to storm waters breaching the
levees? 208
It is possible that an institutionalized futurist position could
have made better use of the external predictions produced. Ideally,
whether an internal office or external consultant provides the
imaginary vision, there would be some transparency into the proposed
scenarios to further the essential job of ensuring crucial tests are fully
carried out.
It would be unrealistic to expect agencies, their dedicated
prognosticators, or outside consultants to always be right. Indeed, it is
surely more likely than not that out-of-the-box risks identified will not
unfold exactly as predicted. It is nonetheless worth starting the stress
test process with as full a range of threats and scenarios as possible.
Although some agencies have, in an ad hoc manner, deployed
imaginative thinking, there is little evidence that regulators are
systematically integrating such analyses. Embedding inherently
visionary posts high in the administrative power structure would offer
a means to construct a less retrospective and more prospective
administrative state.
D. Consequential Outputs
To make it more likely that agency leaders make decisions about
whether to act based on a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis, stress
tests should communicate the full consequences of not improving
organizational performance. A threshold step is to candidly evaluate
the organization. Most agency-focused simulations provide participants
with learning experiences and perhaps produce a list of identified issues
and self-generated strategies. 209 In other words, they are not much

205. Id. at 17.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 2.
209. See, e.g., INST. FOR ALT. FUTURES, supra note 201, at 39 (allowing the participants to
determine takeaways); HHS PANDEMIC SIMULATION DRAFT REP., supra note 68, at 2–5 (providing
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more evaluative than the Saturday Night Live “PASS/PASS” system for
bank stress tests. 210 Those parodied tests give each bank quantitative
performance feedback and a resiliency rating. 211 Administrative stress
tests should also provide each agency with frank feedback and perhaps
something like a grade.
Another component of communicating consequences is
translating results into social implications. Most immediately, the test
should make it clear if the agency’s inadequate planning heightened the
risk of a deep recession, destructive fire, or other major harm. The next
level of output is projecting the harm produced by those higher risks,
such as the tens of thousands of expected additional lives lost due to
the agency’s inadequate response to a simulated influenza.
The more comprehensive the understanding of harm the better.
For many calamities, that means physical, social, and economic
devastation. If a public health stress test were to only report the
implications of a pandemic in terms of lives lost, it would underestimate
the consequences by omitting the associated financial toll and
exacerbated inequality. 212
Comprehensive harm outputs would help focus participants’
minds on the stakes, thereby increasing the chances they will
remember and learn from the experience. 213 Such outputs also serve a
political purpose. Making the economic case for preventing devastation
can prompt action. 214 Research has established that policies benefitting
high-income households are far more likely to materialize. 215 Thus,
estimating the economic implications of crisis prevention makes
passing corresponding policies more likely because influential
stakeholders would better understand the considerable wealth they
may stand to lose without public investments in emergency
management. Transparency alone may be ineffective unless stress tests
adequately convey the complete stakes of performing better to rouse the
media, public, and other stakeholders.

nonevaluative top-level summaries); FEMA Simulation Comm. Hearing, supra note 59, at 2–3
(describing a largely non-evaluative simulation).
210. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
211. HAL S. SCOTT, CONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION: PROTECTING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
FROM PANICS 176–77 (2016).
212. See supra Section I.B.2.
213. See supra Section I.A.1 (discussing the availability heuristic and tendency to increase
risk-taking following near misses).
214. See supra Section I.B.3 (discussing stress tests for financial systems).
215. See generally MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND
POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA (2012).
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There is no single agreed upon set of parameters for analyzing
crisis management. 216 Inevitably, comprehensive outputs would involve
uncertainty. Regulators must therefore make outputs’ incertitude clear.
Failing to do so would create an illusion of precision. 217 To lessen such
misperceptions, regulators could give ranges of estimates, clearly
disclose limitations, and label figures as worst-case, most likely, or
another descriptor. 218
It would be a mistake, however, to omit comprehensive outputs
because of uncertainty. Similar indeterminacy plagues most areas of
governance—including estimates of how much revenue a tax policy will
generate, 219 GDP forecasts, 220 and the likelihood that a merger of two
large firms creates monopoly power. 221 Even the main standard for civil
trials, “preponderance of the evidence,” acknowledges that meaningful
decisions must be made with some level of uncertainty since it allows a
party to win by establishing a likelihood not far above fifty percent. 222
The more appropriate question is whether an estimate of an
exercise’s social implications, regardless of its inability to predict
flawlessly, would improve governance. Without any rigorously
researched estimate, the mind is left to its own optimism biases and
other psychological limitations—which include poor probability
construction. 223 For instance, “the “vast majority of people believe that
they are less likely than others to be subject to automobile accidents,
infection from AIDS, heart attacks, asthma, and many other health
risks,” even though statistically speaking they cannot all be less likely
than most others. 224 Those individual tendencies toward excess risktaking are even more complicated in an organizational setting and
influence “the role of the regulatory state, especially in the area of
216. See Bennear, supra note 184, at 49 (describing options such as “(1) the utility function,
(2) discount rate, (3) risk aversion, and (4) subjective probabilities”).
217. Cf. Michael J. Graetz, Paint-by-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 613–
14 (1995) (commenting that lawmakers suffer from an illusion of precision about the accuracy of
tax law revenue distribution estimates).
218. Id.
219. See id. at 625–26 (discussing tax indeterminacy).
220. See generally YAIR LISTOKIN, LAW AND MACROECONOMICS: LEGAL REMEDIES TO
RECESSIONS 3–4 (2019) (explaining the quality of macroeconomics).
221. Rebecca Haw, Adversarial Economics in Antitrust Litigation: Losing Academic Consensus
in the Battle of the Experts, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1261, 1300 (2012) (describing how economic experts
partaking in litigation fall within a spectrum of opinions in their field of study).
222. Kevin M. Clermont, Trial by Traditional Probability, Relative Plausibility, or Belief
Function?, 66 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 353, 355 (2015) (summarizing the uncertainty involved in
determining the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard and how juries struggle to conceptualize
proof in terms of percentages).
223. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477 (1998).
224. Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1183 (1997).
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dangers to life and health.” 225 Understanding should thus be viewed on
a spectrum. Comprehensive outputs can move people from the
impressionistic toward the more empirically informed end of that
spectrum.
Despite the inevitable indeterminacy of output estimates,
sometimes preparedness can be drastically improved at minimal cost.
That is especially true when part of the problem is organizational, such
as delegating authority for rapidly approving aid relief in the event of
a hurricane striking New Orleans. 226 Most importantly, pressure spurs
the otherwise complacent mind to find solutions. 227 Stress tests with
comprehensive and evaluative outputs would provide such pressure,
particularly on leaders.
*
*
*
A consistent critique in the legal literature is the administrative
state’s inertia in response to a technologically, scientifically, and
financially fast-changing world. 228 Unlike businesses, which face
elimination if they fail, administrative agencies can persist in a state of
underperformance with few consequences. Administrative law
responds by involving Congress, the president, courts, and the public
through annual reports, judicial review, funding allocation, and noticeand-comment rulemaking. 229 Yet those traditional accountability
mechanisms are of limited use in prompting agency leaders to rectify
organizational psychology challenges such as availability heuristics.
225. Id.
226. See supra Section I.B.2. (discussing extreme weather simulations).
227. See generally Shih-Wen Hsiao, Ming-Feng Wang & Chien-Wie Chen, Time Pressure and
Creativity in Industrial Design, 27 INT’L J. TECH. & DESIGN EDUC. 271 (2017) (finding that a lack
of pressure leads to apathy, an appropriate amount of pressure promotes creativity, and excessive
pressure results in frustration).
228. See, e.g., ROSEMARY O’LEARY, ROBERT F. DURANT, DANIEL J. FIORINO & PAUL S. WEILAND,
MANAGING FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: UNDERSTANDING THE LEGAL, ORGANIZATIONAL, AND POLICY
CHALLENGES 332 (1999) (discussing regulators’ inability to keep up because “[m]ost regulated
industries today are more dynamic and complex than they were thirty years ago”). The
sophistication gap facing financial regulators, for example, is pervasive across agencies scrambling
to adapt to increasingly complex and digital markets. Scholars have already offered solutions to
many of these challenges. See generally M. Todd Henderson & Frederick Tung, Pay for Regulator
Performance, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003 (2012) (proposing a new compensation structure for
regulators that awards them for their results); Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV.
678, 682–84 (2013) (proposing principles for managing an increasingly technological financial
sector).
229. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 702, 704 (“[F]inal agency action for which there is no other adequate
remedy in a court [is] subject to judicial review.”); Croley, supra note 150, at 12 (summarizing
oversight mechanisms). Courts have emphasized that judicial review should not extend to a
monitoring role over agencies. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759–60 (1984) (stating that lawsuits
challenging “particular programs agencies establish to carry out their legal obligations . . . are
rarely if ever appropriate for federal-court adjudication”); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)
(“[Acting] as virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action . . . is
not the role of the judiciary . . . .”).
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Mandatory, transparent, imaginative, and comprehensive stress
tests should enter the conversation about how to fill that gap in the
toolkit, and thereby may have a considerably larger role to play in
administrative law. Implementing these principles is important but will
prove challenging. It is not possible to finalize here all of the details of
operationalizing stress tests—and undertaking the cost-benefit
analysis to ensure that the changes are worth the resource
investment. 230 Nonetheless, with these design features as a starting
point, stress tests could help address the legitimacy crisis facing
administrative agencies by increasing the accountability and
effectiveness of delegated authority. 231
At a minimum, an interdisciplinary analysis of simulation
failures and their social, health, economic, and environmental
implications should push agencies to implement lower-cost reforms to
minimize societal risk. Ultimately, the goal is to improve the level of
clarity that stress tests provide about the trade-offs involved in action
and nonaction. Ideally, the nation could effectively use simulations to
learn valuable lessons in advance of calamities, rather than waiting for
them to arrive.
III. APPLYING STRESS TESTS
Designing administrative stress test regimes will require
considerable attention to context-specific details. The written materials
for a single stress test exercise typically fill hundreds of pages. 232
Consequently, a comprehensive treatment of whether and how any
given context merits stress tests is beyond the scope of this Article.
Nonetheless, this Part considers how improved stress tests might
accelerate change within the administrative frameworks surrounding
pandemics, environmental disasters, financial crises, and new private230. See generally Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for
Adaptive Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2014) (proposing ways for the law to encourage
agencies to respond quickly and adaptively); Dominic D. P. Johnson, Rose McDermott, Emily S.
Barrett, Jonathan Cowden, Richard Wrangham, Matthew H. McIntyre & Stephen Peter Rosen,
Overconfidence in Wargames: Experimental Evidence on Expectations, Aggression, Gender and
Testosterone, 273 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y B 2513 (2006) (discussing how participants in close-call
simulations can be overconfident in their ability to emerge victorious in the face of future adverse
scenarios).
231. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
133 (1980) (“That legislators often find it convenient to escape accountability is precisely the
reason for a non-delegation doctrine.”). See generally DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S
NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900–1940 (2014) (providing an
overview of administrative legitimacy challenges).
232. See, e.g., HHS PANDEMIC SIMULATION DRAFT REP., supra note 68 (demonstrating the
length involved).
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sector contexts. In analyzing the preparation for past crises, there is
always a risk of inaccurately concluding in hindsight that some past
mistake could have been avoided when the decisions were in fact
reasonable given the information available at the time.
The purpose below is neither to pass final judgment on past
stress tests nor to propose particular stress tests. Instead, the
immediate task is illuminating the path forward in a more concrete
manner than the broad principles offered above. The larger goal is to
start a conversation about how to improve what has become a major
administrative undertaking.
A. Pandemics
Currently, discretionary public health resources need to focus on
managing the COVID-19 response. After this virus is no longer a crisis,
authorities might deploy stress tests to prepare for the next health
threat. One way to accomplish that goal would be for Congress to
require regular public health stress tests, at least every two or three
years. 233 For such exercises to be successful, it would be important for
HHS and its relevant sub-agencies—most notably the CDC and the
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response—to be
required to participate. Legislation would also ideally mandate the
involvement of the directors of these and other relevant agencies, such
as the FDA and NIH.
As one of many public health threats that could be examined,
consider how the Crimson Contagion stress test might have been
improved. One of the most notable omissions from the simulation was
any consideration of virus testing. If virus testing had been included as
an input, it would have revealed the glaring weaknesses discussed
above, such as the excessively slow process for approving screening
centers and scientific testing methods. 234 HHS’s failure to include virus
testing as one of the considerations in Crimson Contagion demonstrates
a fatal shortcoming in determining key issues to evaluate in public
health simulations.
We cannot simply dismiss the lack of testing as something that
is obvious now but was impossible to predict. From an institutional
perspective, if HHS had an effective futurist-led team designing its
stress tests, it would have surveyed past critical issues faced elsewhere

233. The frequency of the stress tests should reflect the magnitude of the threat. There is no
one right answer in terms of whether smaller stress tests of individual agencies or issues, such as
vaccine distribution, would be preferable.
234. See supra Section I.B.1.
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when generating as comprehensive a list of scenarios as possible. 235
That research would have surely included South Korea’s experience
with a 2015 outbreak of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (“MERS”),
in which the country’s inadequate testing proved deadly. 236
As a result of that lesson, South Korean health authorities
subsequently implemented a collaborative system in which regulators
and researchers could respond quickly to supply new testing kits. 237 The
country also passed legislation “providing for the immediate approval
of testing systems in the event of a health crisis.” 238 Those legislative
and regulatory responses produced results. For instance, South Korea
had its first confirmed COVID-19 death the same week as the United
States did. 239 Within seven days, South Korea tested more people per
day—ten thousand—than the United States tested in the entire month
after its first death. 240
That disparity is unsurprising given that early in the pandemic
often only a single testing site was available even in populous states,
such as Massachusetts. 241 That state’s two world-renowned hospitals,
Brigham & Women’s and Mass General, took weeks to begin testing due
to bureaucratic hurdles. In the meantime, the only option was a small
CDC site. 242 If it had included the South Korea experience as part of the
design, Crimson Contagion would have probed U.S. screening capacity.
Following the simulation, the participants could have advocated for the
CDC to improve its virus testing and the FDA to adopt a streamlined
pandemic screening approval process for independent labs.
Another path for increasing the chances that the Crimson
Contagion exercise included screening would have been external
oversight of the simulation’s design—such as by an independent
academic advisory board. Among academic researchers in
epidemiology, screening was a well-known determinant of pandemic
response success. 243

235. See supra Section II.C.
236. Kim & Denyer, supra note 145.
237. Id.
238. Victor Cha, South Korea Offers a Lesson in Best Practices, FOREIGN AFFS. (Apr. 10, 2020),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-04-10/south-korea-offers-lesson-bestpractices [https://perma.cc/49MA-QQNV].
239. Sheri Fink & Mike Baker, ‘It’s Just Everywhere Already’: How Delays in Testing Set Back
the U.S. Coronavirus Response, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/10/us/coronavirustesting-delays.html (last updated Mar. 16, 2021) [https://perma.cc/5YJ9-AMGA].
240. Id. (reporting that as of March 13, 2020, the CDC had conducted only 8,500 tests total,
while South Korea had, by late February, been able to test 10,000 people per day).
241. See Ryan et al., supra note 80.
242. Id.
243. On the well-established value of virus testing, see id.
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Taking a step back, the Crimson Contagion design may have
made it less likely that key decisionmakers would act on any findings
from the exercise because the number of deaths was an input—fixed in
advance to underscore the gravity of the situation. 244 A better-designed
simulation would instead produce final reports with stark estimates for
the additional number of deaths due to poor virus testing, vaccination,
and other pandemic infrastructure. 245 The final reports would also
ideally have produced estimates of the potential economic savings,
including higher employment rates, if the government had performed
better.
The point here is not to critique the COVID-19 pandemic
response. We will never know what could have prevented the lost month
of virus testing that enabled the original exponential growth of cases,
or the subsequent shortages in testing. 246 Nonetheless, comprehensive
public stress test reports would provide a paper trail that could
motivate key decisionmakers to ensure that they were not responsible
for ignoring such dire warnings. 247 The current limited adoption of
stress tests provides leaders with too much political cover because they
can always claim they were unaware of an exercise’s findings or that
the consequences were unclear.
If it had been faced with alarming Crimson Contagion reports
released to the public, Congress may not have taken what seems in
hindsight to have been a bad move: significantly cutting the CDC
budget in 2019. 248 More comprehensive simulation outputs would at
least have forced agency leaders to directly grasp the consequences of
remaining stagnant, which could have influenced allocation of existing
244. HHS PANDEMIC SIMULATION DRAFT REP., supra note 68, at 9.
245. These estimates are feasible. Indeed, they are in line with the types of estimates that the
government currently undertakes for varying levels of intervention, such as a faster vaccine
FOR
HEALTH
METRICS
&
EVALUATION,
rollout.
COVID-19
Projections,
INST.
https://covid19.healthdata.org/united-states-of-america?view=total-deaths&tab=trend
(last
visited Feb. 17, 2022) [https://perma.cc/STD3-C8JX] (providing projections by day under various
scenarios). The figures should include not only deaths caused by the simulated virus itself, but
also deaths from other life-threatening issues in patients (such as those with lung disease who
needed ventilators) who could not get access to critical care because hospitals were overwhelmed
with the pandemic.
246. Michael D. Shear, Abby Goodnough, Sheila Kaplan, Sheri Fink, Katie Thomas & Noah
Weiland, The Lost Month: How a Failure to Test Blinded the U.S. to Covid-19, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/us/testing-coronavirus-pandemic.html (last updated Oct. 1,
2021) [https://perma.cc/C5G4-YMSA] (quoting former heads of the CDC and FDA, among other
officials).
247. A risk here is that this pressure causes leaders to be overly responsive. Though, given the
psychological tendencies for underpreparing, more pressure has the potential to move the
preparation level in the right direction.
248. Sanger et al., supra note 67 (mentioning funding levels and the President’s budget cut
proposal of nine percent in 2020).
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resources. The broader point is that government leaders should make
public decisions with a full picture of the risks of not preparing—both
in terms of their own reputations and the well-being of society.
Well-designed public health simulations could have also
prompted
several
straightforward,
low-cost
organizational
improvements, any of which could have considerably lessened COVID19’s economic devastation and saved many lives, such as a more
streamlined screening approval process or better organizational
partnerships in place for vaccine distribution. Poorly designed public
health stress tests may thus be part of the answer to an early question
posed by the nation’s leading pandemic epidemiologist: “Why . . . were
we not able to mobilize on a broader scale?” 249
B. Environmental Disasters
Disaster response agencies voluntarily conduct localized
environmental stress test scenarios, such as an earthquake striking
San Francisco or a chemical spill at a New Jersey factory. 250 Congress
and state legislatures might mandate such exercises with specific
timetables, public reports, inspector general oversight, and the heads of
the agencies involved. These mandates would need to vary in frequency
and intensity depending on the context.
In the case of the simulation that preceded Hurricane
Katrina, however, the problems went beyond the delays discussed
above. Local officials testified that their participation in the simulation
taught them lessons that they subsequently implemented in the face of
Katrina. 251 Yet the simulation prompted no such action on the part of
FEMA prior to the hurricane. 252 Whereas local leaders could go back to
their communities and make changes, the FEMA participants did not
have that same authority because the Agency’s director was not
involved. 253
In addition to the simulation’s omission of the possibility that
water levels would breach the city’s outer walls, it also did not probe
how participants would manage pre-storm evacuations. 254 The
simulation’s designers knew that the current evacuation preparedness
249. Shear et al., supra note 246 (quoting Dr. Anthony Fauci of the National Institute of
Health).
250. See HHS PANDEMIC SIMULATION DRAFT REP., supra note 68, at 2–5 (an example of one
such localized exercise).
251. FEMA Simulation Comm. Hearing, supra note 59, at 13.
252. See id. (investigating FEMA’s simulation).
253. Id. at 20–21. The governor of Louisiana and other major decisionmakers did not
participate, limiting simulation-related action to local entities. Id.
254. Id. at 23–24.
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was insufficient to coordinate six hundred buses and convince people to
leave, but that variable was eliminated due to scope management. 255
The omission of the levee breach and evacuation variables would
have been less likely with greater transparency and oversight. Instead,
the out-of-sight power dynamic was between local officials who were
essentially beneficiaries of the more powerful federal officials who had
granted local officials’ requests to fund a simulation. Adding academics,
the press, and the public to the debate about what was important to
include would have at least somewhat leveled the negotiation power
dynamics and placed more pressure on FEMA to be thorough.
Also, the hurricane simulation failed to communicate the full
stakes of acting in terms of the potential number of lives saved and
economic wreckage avoided if officials had planned pre-storm
evacuations and strengthened the city’s storm defense infrastructure.
At a minimum, with leaders involved and consequences communicated,
stress tests would better set up organizations for implementing low-cost
improvements, such as developing the missing emergency management
plans. 256 More importantly, informed leaders are better situated to push
for more resource-intense steps like rebuilding physical infrastructure.
The goal of government readiness in environmental matters is
intertwined with private-sector readiness. In some areas, such as oil
spills, chemical leaks, and power grid failures, no amount of
government stress tests will suffice if the private actors involved are
insufficiently cautious. Currently, the regime for environmental stress
testing of companies varies greatly. Unlike banks and nuclear
facilities, 257 electrical utilities, oil producers, and other energy
companies face fewer, if any, stress test requirements.
To elaborate on the case of oil companies, the Oil Pollution Act
of 1990 compels oil companies to develop plans to respond to crises. 258
255. Id.
256. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (describing FEMA’s lack of emergency plans).
257. PAC. GAS & ELEC. CO., supra note 59, at 35.
258. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 27012762) (allocating funds for the National Response System); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j) (defining
the requirements of the National Response System, such as requiring owners and operators of
vessels to “to prepare and submit to the President a plan for responding, to the maximum extent
practicable, to a worst case discharge, and to a substantial threat of such a discharge, of oil or a
hazardous substance”); Hope M. Babcock, A Risky Business: Generation of Nuclear Power and
Deepwater Drilling for Offshore Oil and Gas, 37 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 63 (2012) (discussing how oil
companies prepare to deal with the disasters that are inherent to their existence). The EPA has
the statutory authority to require companies to develop risk management plans for natural
disasters like hurricanes, floods, and wildfires, which can cause industrial facilities to release
airborne hazardous chemicals. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1728 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050); Clean Air Act Risk
Management Program, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(B)(ii) (requiring owners and operators of stationary
sources of regulated substances beyond a threshold quantity to “prepare and implement a risk
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For instance, as part of its approval permit process for the Deepwater
Horizon platform, BP Oil submitted a “worst-case scenario” spill that
the company forecasted as 250,000 barrels. 259 When a wellhead at BP
Oil’s Deepwater Horizon offshore platform severed in 2010, it
discharged 4.5 million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico, decimating
the environment and costing local communities an estimated fifty
billion dollars. 260 Yet the federal agency tasked with reviewing BP’s
plan failed to recognize the submitted number as a low-risk scenario. 261
Nor was BP subjected to scrutiny in terms of its potential responses to
such a spill. Indeed, these permit application requirements are not even
stress tests—rather, they are a scenario analysis without an
accompanying simulation and evaluation.
In areas such as oil drilling, the government could occasionally
require stress tests as part of obtaining a permit, once the agency is
likely to grant the permit. Pre-license testing is routine in other areas
of activity implicating safety, such as obtaining a license to operate a
motor vehicle or become an electrician. 262 Before authorities allow a
Keystone Pipeline extension or drilling off the coast of Alaska, for
instance, the responsible company might be required to undertake a
simulation of how they would respond to spills. The final report would
include evaluative metrics such as the likelihood of containing the spill,
potential damage to the ecosystem, and the economic toll to local
communities.
The governmental licensing entity could then consider the
comprehensive outputs of those stress tests in weighing whether to
grant the application. That consideration could help improve privatized
risk management by providing greater incentives to internalize the
risks associated with business operations. Another way of
conceptualizing this is as using stress tests to better calibrate decisions
about which companies should receive risk management delegation.
management plan to detect and prevent or minimize accidental releases of such substances from
the stationary source”); see Bratspies & Lamdan, supra note 187, at 579 (explaining how in 2017,
due to Hurricane Harvey, over “forty industrial sites, including refineries and plastics plants,
released dangerous amounts of hazardous pollutants into the air” in Texas and Louisiana).
259. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP
WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 84 (2011),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4C9M-HGUV].
260. David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill Is Gone: The Gulf of Mexico, Environmental Crime,
and the Criminal Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1418 (2011).
261. See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING,
supra note 259, at 84.
262. See generally Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The Permit Power Revisited: The Theory and
Practice of Regulatory Permits in the Administrative State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133 (2014) (outlining the
extensive use of permits in the administrative state).
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Additionally, the tests could inform the conditions that the government
places on licenses. Depending on the stress test results, the company
might need to commit to investing in certain precautions, such as
additional training, or scaling back the scope of its operations.
Of course, the additional stress tests and precautions would
impose higher costs on businesses that would need to be weighed
against the benefits. To limit the regulatory burden, this requirement
might only make sense if the company is requesting a permit for
something new, has a suspect track record, or has not recently
undertaken a stress test for similar projects. But the resources devoted
to the test are not necessarily economic waste and indeed may help to
address a market failure of oil companies failing to internalize risks. 263
Stress tests can thus contribute to economically valuable organizational
learning even for companies that routinely obtain licenses.
Stress tests could occasionally continue as the project develops,
informed by any scientific or other advances in understanding risks.
The regulator might provide new scenarios brought to light after the
granting of the license—such as unusual potential causes of damage to
the underwater oil wellhead, or an oil spill occurring during a storm.
The company would then simulate its response. Other environmental
areas beyond oil that could be worth stress testing include coal plant
explosions that regularly release toxic fly ash into nearby communities,
chemical spills by manufacturers that poison local residents, and
electrical utility power blackouts that leave millions vulnerable in the
midst of a snow storm. 264
To be clear, environmental stress tests have limits in terms of
the problems they can solve. Most notably, stress tests are not
particularly well-suited to directly tackle arguably the world’s most
pressing threat: global warming. 265 Arguably, global warming
progresses too gradually and causes too broad an array of harms that
are difficult to link to any single agency or hazard.
Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to see stress tests as
irrelevant even to this challenge. Most immediately, the kinds of
disasters discussed above—oil spills, wildfires, and hurricanes—
implicate climate change. For instance, natural disasters like
263. See Squire, supra note 42 (discussing environmental externalities).
264. See, e.g., Patricia Helman, Student Article, Toxic Impact: The Regulation of Coal Ash and
the Influence of Big Money on Small Communities, 23 BARRY L. REV. 41, 44–48 (2017) (discussing
the dangers of fly ash to nearby communities).
265. Leaders of the world’s largest businesses, governments, and nonprofits have identified
global warming as one of the leading global risks. See WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL RISKS
REPORT 2017, at 6 (12th ed. 2017), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GRR17_Report_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BCD9-6NM2].
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hurricanes, floods, and wildfires can cause industrial facilities to
release airborne hazardous chemicals. 266 Approximately fifteen
thousand U.S. facilities must provide risk management plans to the
EPA for such threats. 267 To the extent that stress tests prepare the
government to prevent or contain various environmental disasters, the
results would contribute to the necessarily fragmented and
multifaceted effort to curb climate change.
More importantly, stress tests can encourage a more
comprehensive consideration of the costs of environmental threats. As
illustrated by Deepwater Horizon, some regulators and businesses
irrationally (or strategically) ignore the full societal risks of
development projects. If stress tests clarify and accentuate those full
risks, they help address the availability heuristic and thereby
encourage a more accurate decision about whether a given project is
worthwhile. To the extent that such accuracy discourages some projects
that would have otherwise occurred, such as building coal plants or
extracting oil, stress tests could cancel projects that would have
otherwise led to greater global warming. Stress tests might thus be part
of the broader reckoning occurring in the private sector, which is in the
process of pricing global warming into its business models. 268
Finally, stress tests outside of environmental agencies might
incorporate climate change forecasts. Federal agencies, led by a
steering committee with representatives from the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, the Department of Energy, and the
Environmental Protection Agency, must publish a National Climate
Assessment report every four years. 269 These reports consider futureoriented scenarios and include accountability outputs. The latest report
provided a worst-case scenario that temperatures could rise by as high
as nine degrees by 2100, with the “risks of inaction” being hundreds of
billions of dollars in additional costs and thousands more lives lost
annually in the United States. 270

266. Bratspies & Lamdan, supra note 187, at 579 (noting the dangerous release of hazardous
pollutants after Hurricane Harvey in 2017).
267. Id. at 586 (noting that as of 2008, nine years after the final program went into place,
fourteen thousand of these facilities had submitted their plans).
268. See Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, 95 WASH. L. REV. 1, 48–56
(2020) (discussing how investor pressure can help reduce greenhouse gas emissions).
269. Global Change Research Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-606, 104 Stat. 3096 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 2921-2961) (establishing the United States Global Change Research Program, and
requiring the periodic production of a climate assessment to be presented to the president and the
Congress).
270. 2 U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RSCH. PROGRAM, FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT:
IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES 42, 551–52 (rev. Mar. 2021),
https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/downloads/NCA4_2018_FullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc//AJ4B-

604

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:2:553

These reports do not push any organization to simulate its
scenarios, and thus are not stress tests. Nonetheless, those estimates
are comprehensive enough to touch myriad areas of government. Since
poor air quality significantly increased the number of people that died
from COVID-19, 271 how should HHS adjust its simulations of pandemicinduced pneumonia deaths to account for climate change predictions? If
large numbers of people migrate from their current coastal dwellings,
where will they go, and at what costs to mortgage markets, insurance
companies, border skirmishes, and the economy? How should the
Federal Reserve respond to the financial instability implications of
global warming inducing more wildfires, floods, hurricanes, and health
crises? 272 The most straightforward benefit of implementing such
climate change considerations into other types of stress tests would be
to improve the accuracy of the underlying estimates.
That input could have the further benefit of raising greater
awareness of climate change among key decisionmakers in government.
With Federal Reserve officials more aware of the financial stability
implications of climate change, they may be more willing to advocate
for environmental action—a process that appears to have already
begun. 273 Moreover, financial regulatory officials may have something
to offer climate change forecasts. The National Climate Assessment
omits consideration of financial stability, for instance. 274 Thus,
policymakers may currently underestimate the full risks of climate
change, in part due to its disconnect from financial forecasting.
In sum, the clearest and most immediately promising
application of environmental stress tests is applying them more
comprehensively to the prevention of natural and industrial disasters.
That alone could save lives, prevent economic harms, and lessen
environmental damage. A more ambitious interagency vision for
YQEK] (“Without significant greenhouse gas mitigation, the increase in global annual average
temperature could reach 9°F or more by the end of this century.”).
271. See X. Wu, R. C. Nethery, M. B. Sabath, D. Braun & F. Dominici, Air Pollution and
COVID-19 Mortality in the United States: Strengths and Limitations of an Ecological Regression
Analysis, 6 SCI. ADVANCES, Nov. 4, 2020 (finding a positive association between air pollution
exposure and COVID-19 mortality rates).
272. See Christina Parajon Skinner, Central Banks and Climate Change, 74 VAND. L. REV.
1301, 1308–09 (2021) (analyzing the Federal Reserve’s “legal authority to address climate
change . . . through its powers in regard to monetary policy; to regulate and supervise banks; or to
research and convene”).
273. See Mary C. Daly, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of S.F., Remarks at
the Economics of Climate Change Conference: Why Climate Change Matters to Us 4 (Nov. 8, 2019),
https://www.frbsf.org/our-district/files/Speech-Daly-Economics-of-Climate-ChangeConference.pdf [https://perma.cc/95N4-79TZ] (stating that climate change “can destroy wealth,
exacerbate existing income inequalities, and . . . displace people permanently”).
274. See 2 U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RSCH. PROGRAM, supra note 270.
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applying stress tests would integrate climate change forecasts into
other areas of government in a feedback loop. Interlinked stress tests
could then enhance advocacy and problem solving not only for agencies
but for efforts to mobilize against climate change. 275
C. Financial Crises
Consider how redesigned stress tests might enhance financial
stability. A straightforward step is recognizing that the magnitude of
the problem may be much greater than even the Federal Reserve’s
current “worst-case” predictions. The actual drop in GDP due to
COVID-19 was three times what the Federal Reserve assumed in the
most negative scenario of its 2020 stress test. 276 Even though the stress
test’s worst-case scenario was nowhere near as bad as prior historical
downturns, industry lobbied against the mild figures used by the
Federal Reserve by arguing they were unrealistically negative. 277
Financial regulators could address this by using not only a highly
unlikely scenario, but also occasionally a truly extreme scenario that
would forecast a worse economic downturn than anything the country
has ever seen.
Another problem in need of examination is that the designers of
financial stress tests have focused more on changing numbers than
changing events. They create different figures for the credit supply,
GDP, or the length of the recession, but too often they do not imagine
new types of triggers for the economic downturn—such as the triggers
for the last two downturns: a housing-sector meltdown and a
pandemic. 278
The specific causes of the downturn are important beyond the
numbers because they illuminate new complications. As demonstrated
by both the mortgage failure and COVID-19 aftermaths, particular
275. This vision connects to democratic experimentalism. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F.
Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 345 (1998) (“The
agencies are [ ] the continuing organized link between the national and the local, helping to create
through national action the local conditions for experimentation, and changing national
arrangements accordingly.”).
276. See Judge, supra note 9 (summarizing and criticizing the Federal Reserve’s approach to
stress tests during COVID-19). Of course, the recovery also seems to have been faster than that
modeled. For a broader discussion of stress tests as too soft, see Baradaran, supra note 9, at 1297.
Some see the “unlikely” scenarios as wasteful. See, e.g., Garrett J. Moore, Pass or Fail? Grading
the Effectiveness of Stress Tests a Decade After the Financial Crisis, 23 N.C. BANKING INST. 333,
350 (2019) (“[D]e-regulators argue that the stress tests are too stringent because the hypothetical
stressful scenarios that the Federal Reserve puts the banks through are essentially doomsday type
situations that are very unlikely to happen in real life.”).
277. Moore, supra note 276, at 350.
278. For a comprehensive summary of bank stress tests, their history, and shortcomings, as
well as other helpful insights into how to improve them, see Turk, supra note 9, at 1719.
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events can cause financial instruments and institutions to act in ways
that have never happened in prior downturns with different causes. The
2020 recession brought the unprecedented combination of most nations’
economies suddenly and significantly contracting, a major slump in
international trade volume, large increases in debt, bonds and stocks
losing value in unison (contrary to their typical inverse relationship),
and treasuries becoming illiquid. 279 To create more imaginative stress
tests, including unfamiliar quantitative scenarios, the tests should
probe what would happen to financial institutions under more detailed
real-world shocks.
To be clear, the Federal Reserve will almost surely incorporate
pandemic economic indicators into its future stress tests. But in some
sense that illustrates the problem, not the solution. Financial
regulators must get ahead of the next crisis rather than hewing too
closely to past events. The needed approach starts with learning from
history but also requires imagining new threats that might emerge.
Examples of exploring novel scenarios can be found in other countries.
After record-high temperatures and severe droughts fueled months of
devastating fires, Australia’s stress test supervisor in 2020 expanded
its financial institution stress tests to include climate change risks, 280
and the Netherlands has taken similar steps. 281 U.K. authorities have
instructed financial institutions to take the threats created by financial
technology disruption more seriously in mandatory stress tests. 282
Scholars have also produced scenarios that regulators ignored.
In 2002, Kathleen Engel and Pat McCoy wrote of a mortgage crisis

279. Irwin, supra note 114. The point is not that these occurrences are unprecedented, but
more that the specifics of the trigger can help to push stress tests toward modeling a greater
diversity of unfamiliar market dynamics.
280. Stress Testing Assessment: Findings and Feedback, AUSTL. PRUDENTIAL REGUL. AUTH. 3
(Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.apra.gov.au/stress-testing-assessment-findings-and-feedback
[https://perma.cc/R4XN-Q5GC].
281. See ROBERT VERMEULEN, EDO SCHETS, MELANIE LOHUIS, BARBARA KÖLBL, DAVID-JAN
JANSEN & WILLEM HEERINGA, DE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK N.V., AN ENERGY TRANSITION RISK
STRESS TEST FOR THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM OF THE NETHERLANDS, 16-7 OCCASIONAL STUD. 7 (2018),
https://www.dnb.nl/media/pdnpdalc/201810_nr-_7_-2018_an_energy_transition_risk_stress_test_for_the_financial_system_of_the_netherlands.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JS37-XPEX] (incorporating energy and climate change considerations into
financial stress tests).
282. Jonathan Lawrence, Bank of England Stress Tests Reveal FinTech Competition, K&L
GATES: FINTECH L. BLOG (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.fintechlawblog.com/2017/12/bank-ofengland-stress-tests-reveal-fintech-competition [https://perma.cc/Q6JS-2TU4] (describing the
consideration of cybersecurity and other technological threats).
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several years before the problems they identified helped spark the 2008
recession. 283 Yet regulators explicitly dismissed such warnings. 284
One newer threat that academics have argued is worth
exploring, but regulators have yet to incorporate into their stress tests,
is a future when most people rely on sophisticated digital assistants for
almost all spending and financial decisions. 285 If tens of millions of
Americans are advised by the same Google Assistant or Apple’s Siri to
move their deposits from Citibank to Goldman Sachs because they can
earn higher interest rates, a modern version of a bank run could
result. 286
That threat is invisible to financial regulators in large part due
to the nature of past financial crises. In the 1800s and early 1900s, a
major threat to financial instability was that depositors would panic
and rush to withdraw their money. 287 Those bank runs can cause even
healthy banks to fail because banks keep only a fraction of deposits on
hand at any given time and instead use most deposits for other
purposes, such as extending home loans. Lawmakers responded with
Federal Deposit Insurance, which currently reimburses up to $250,000
of depositors’ funds if a bank collapses. 288 That insurance promotes
widespread trust in banks, thus lessening the chances that consumers
will “run” on the bank out of panic. 289
In contrast, a digital bank run would be motivated by
opportunity rather than panic and is thus impervious to the regulatory
architecture’s main line of defense against traditional bank runs.
Agencies may instead need new regulatory tools, like a circuit breaker
or pause button built into digital assistants’ financial advice, similar to
what stock exchanges currently have when trading becomes too

283. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 133, at 1257–59.
284. See Kara Scannell & Sudeep Reddy, Greenspan Admits Errors to Hostile House Panel,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 24, 2008, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122476545437862295
[https://perma.cc/RF9Z-7Q8X].
285. See, e.g., Tom Baker & Benedict Dellaert, Regulating Robo Advice Across the Financial
Services Industry, 103 IOWA L. REV. 713, 714–15 (2018); Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More
Competitive, 65 UCLA L. REV. 232, 234 (2018).
286. Rory Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, 117 MICH. L. REV. 815, 868 (2019).
287. BARR ET AL., supra note 111, at 42–48.
288. Anthony J. Casey & Eric A. Posner, A Framework for Bailout Regulation, 91 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 479, 480 (2015).
289. As another example of a technological stress test, some have proposed probing how the
financial system would withstand a cyberattack. See, e.g., Tom C.W. Lin, Financial Weapons of
War, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1377, 1431 (2016) (“Policymakers should design advanced technological
stress tests to assess the information technology infrastructure of systemically important private
and public financial institutions and agencies.”); see also, e.g., Nizan Geslevich Packin, Too-Big-toFail 2.0? Digital Service Providers as Cyber-Social Systems, 93 IND. L.J. 1211 (2018) (arguing for
similar attention to critical technological service providers as is paid to big banks for instability).
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volatile. 290 These kinds of futuristic disasters that the current legal
architecture is inadequate to prevent are the types that should be
modeled as part of imaginative stress tests.
Outlandish scenarios rooted in real-world trends are worth
considering even though—like many past triggers of financial crises—
they are individually unlikely to occur. The nature of new triggers for
financial downturns is that they are implausible until they actually
happen. For instance, nobody saw Reddit, Robinhood, and other
technologies driving the kind of wild fluctuations of GameStop and
other stocks in early 2021. 291 Stress tests should consider unusual
scenarios driven by the diverse digital platforms influencing finance,
and it is in some ways shocking that—decades after the internet became
mainstream—they still do not.
That approach not only would prepare for as many specific
scenarios identified as possible but may also indicate actions that would
be relevant to a broader set of unforeseen triggers. For instance, if bank
regulators could pause automated digital assistants in the case of
emergency, it would also guard against a scenario in which hackers
were suddenly using those digital assistants to withdraw funds from
millions of accounts—even if that specific scenario was not the one that
had led lawmakers to extend the pause authority. Imaginative stress
tests thus increase the chances that government is prepared even for
threats different from those in the unlikely scenarios.
So far, the discussion has focused on making existing bank stress
tests more imaginative. 292 However, existing stress tests focus on the
bank’s responses. Another key shift is implementing stress tests of the
Federal Reserve and other key financial regulators, rather than just of
banks. The idea would be to bring to the financial system what
currently exists in the military, where the Pentagon simulates what
command headquarters would do in the face of a nuclear attack. 293
290. Van Loo, supra note 286, at 879–80 (discussing the NYSE’s pause feature and potential
use of slow-down mechanisms by regulators).
291. See Matt Phillips & Taylor Lorenz, ‘Dumb Money’ Is on GameStop, and It’s Beating Wall
Street at Its Own Game, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/27/business/gamestopwall-street-bets.html (last updated Feb. 25, 2021) [https://perma.cc/QSZ2-U2BQ] (discussing how
social media facilitated massive increases in GameStop share prices).
292. Stress tests of banks indirectly help agencies assess their performance in preventing a
crisis, because if a bank fails, then the regulator has failed in one of its primary missions.
293. For an excellent proposal for improving financial regulators’ training for crises through
simulations, see Crawford, supra note 9, at 161–74. For valuable ideas on how to reform bank
stress tests with more of a public component, see, for example, Baradaran, supra note 9, at 1319,
which argues that bank stress tests should draw from military war games exercises; Turk, supra
note 9, at 1701, which proposes that the stress test rules written by financial regulators be stress
tested; and Weber, supra note 9, at 2242, which offers a large array of improvements to financial
stress tests.
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To accomplish that goal, the law could mandate that authorities
create well-developed plans with specific actions that agency leadership
and other employees would take in a crisis. Which meetings would be
called with which external stakeholders? When every second counts and
multiple decisions must be made, how should the Federal Reserve Chair
prioritize issues? It was alarming that financial regulators—whose
primary goal is financial stability—did not have tested emergency plans
in place in the last financial crisis. 294
In a financial crisis, like in a pandemic, time is of the essence. 295
Stocks may plunge precipitously, mass layoffs may occur, and healthy
companies may fold before Congress can act. 296 Agency and
congressional staff will not have time, once an emergency arrives, to
thoroughly research best practices from all past calamities, domestic
and abroad, and craft responses. An exercise addressing those
challenges would therefore require financial regulators to undertake a
fire drill by forcing them to hold meetings and make decisions as if a
given digital bank run, deadly pandemic, or unprecedented economic
downturn had occurred. The agency’s futurist or innovation officer
would provide scenarios for stress tests. If mandated by Congress, the
inspector general or some outside entity could produce a report card for
the agency’s performance, including how many banks failed, or trillions
of dollars in household wealth were lost, due to poor judgment.
One of the outputs of financial stress tests could be draft
legislation on whatever stimulus, modification to financial institution
bankruptcy, or other intervention might be needed in light of the
particular scenario tested. Draft legislation is crucial in financial
regulation because lawmakers pressed for time are more likely to rely
on bills drafted by lobbyists. 297 As the economic crisis of 2020 arrived,
Congress had just days to write the biggest stimulus package the
country has ever adopted, leaving the $2.2 trillion legislation especially
susceptible to influence by the lobbyists that bombarded the process. 298
The 2008 bailout package for the auto industry and financial
294. See supra Section I.B.3 (discussing limitations of financial regulatory stress tests).
295. Andrew P. Atkins, The AIG Bailout: Constraining the Fed’s Discretion, 14 N.C. BANKING
INST. 335, 358 (2010) (emphasizing “speed and flexibility” as crucial in financial emergencies).
296. Id.
297. Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Who Passes Business’s “Model Bills”? Policy Capacity and
Corporate Influence in U.S. State Politics, 12 PERSPS. ON POL. 582, 587 (2014).
298. See Erica Werner, Mike DeBonis & Paul Kane, Senate Approves 2.2 Trillion Coronavirus
Bill Aimed at Slowing Economic Free Fall, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/03/25/trump-senate-coronavirus-economicstimulus-2-trillion/ [https://perma.cc/44EH-T74Q] (“Lawmakers and the White House were
bombarded with lobbyists and special-interest groups seeking assistance during the
negotiations . . . .”).
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institutions similarly unfolded in days, prompting considerable
criticism once it became clear how much of the package had benefitted
large banks and their senior executives. 299
Thus, although not essential, the participation of congressional
staffers in some financial regulatory stress tests is worth considering,
particularly those working for legislators on the U.S. House Committee
on Financial Services and the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs. 300 Off-the-shelf draft statutes and
regulatory plans—developed more imaginatively without time
pressure—would provide stronger foundations for rapid adjustments
when the next financial collapse arrives. Financial crises thus
illuminate a more expansive vision for stress tests’ broader potential as
a public governance tool beyond administrative agencies.
D. Stress Testing Tech and Beyond
This Article has identified many contexts in which laws and
administrative agencies mandate stress tests of private entities. Those
mandates reach banks, nuclear power plants, and hospitals, among
others. The discussion has also briefly explored whether other areas,
such as environmental and trade regulation, merit more robust stress
testing of private entities. A question surfaced by these discussions is
what other private-sector contexts might be candidates for stress tests.
In identifying new contexts, two features stand out as indicating
that mandated stress tests have potential to help: risks of great societal
harms combined with externalities that make businesses unlikely to
adequately internalize those risks. Another factor that could be
persuasive to some, but is difficult to determine, is the degree to which
the entity plays a quasi-public role. Some tech companies, such as
Google and Facebook, may have become so central to society, for
everything from information access to elections, that it is worth
thinking of how stress tests might be integrated into their
governance. 301
299. See Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 438 (2011) (commenting
that financial firms receiving government bailouts, particularly AIG, were criticized for then
providing lavish executive bonuses).
300. See Martha L. Cochran, David F. Freeman & Helen Mayer Clark, Money Market Fund
Reform: SEC Rulemaking in the FSOC Era, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 861, 906 (noting that as a
condition of Dodd-Frank the Federal Reserve Board of Governors must report to these two
committees on any emergency lending program within seven days of initiation).
301. On the broader point of how risk management may be necessary to address the growing
risks posed by some tech companies and the information age more broadly, see, for example,
Packin, supra note 289, at 1215 (calling for new risk management of digital service providers such
as Google, Amazon, Apple, and Facebook); and Cohen, supra note 17, at 391 (“If regulators are to
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One subject matter area that may fit these basic criteria is
cybersecurity. 302 In 2021, hackers shut down one of the largest U.S.
pipelines until the owner, Colonial, paid a ransom. 303 Since the pipeline
provides forty-five percent of the East Coast’s fuel, the event disrupted
transportation. 304 This attack also showed how hackers might disable
critical infrastructure upon which the nation depends. Criminal groups
have launched similar ransomware attacks against hospitals and
manufacturers, but private entities typically try to cover up those
events, which may cause people to underestimate the extent of the
threat.
One challenge in drawing any definitive conclusions about the
need for stress tests for cybersecurity is that businesses surely have
incentives to guard against such attacks. Many technology companies
have voluntarily adopted stress tests to probe their defenses against
hackers. 305 Moreover, it would be difficult to determine when that
incentive is adequate, leading to the risk of overprescribing stress tests.
However, companies also arguably have incentives to avoid legal
violations, to escape monetary penalties, and to minimize reputational
harm. Yet strong incentives have not always proved sufficient to deter
misbehavior. Additionally, there may be economies of scale in a
governmental stress testing program, which would spread the costs of
designing imaginative scenarios and consequential outputs across
many different private-sector organizations.
Another business context that officials have recently analyzed
for stress tests is supply-chain management. The COVID-19 pandemic
illustrated the vulnerability of supply chains in pharmaceuticals, highcapacity batteries, semiconductor chips, and critical minerals. 306
Whereas
supply-chain
breakdowns
decimated
most
auto
manufacturers, Toyota withstood shortages during the pandemic
develop a more effective set of tools for avoiding systemic breakdown, more comprehensive
engagement with threat modeling and its pitfalls is essential.”).
302. Cybersecurity has entered into the academic conversations about bank stress tests. See,
e.g., Richard J. Herring & Til Schuermann, Objectives and Challenges for Stress Testing, in
HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL STRESS TESTING (J. Doyne Farmer, Alissa Kleinnijenhuis, Til
Schuermann & Thom Wetzer eds., forthcoming 2022) (proposing cybersecurity attention in stress
tests).
303. David E. Sanger, Clifford Krauss & Nicole Perlroth, Cyberattack Forces a Shutdown of a
Top U.S. Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/08/us/politics/cyberattackcolonial-pipeline.html (last updated May 13, 2021) [https://perma.cc/LP42-N66Z].
304. Id.
305. Nathan Alexander Sales, Privatizing Cybersecurity, 65 UCLA L. REV. 620, 634, 686 (2018)
(describing “bug bounty programs, in which software vendors and other companies offer modest
cash rewards to researchers who report vulnerabilities in their products and then issue patches
for the flaws” and how bug bounties can be paid to outside hackers or in-house employees).
306. Tausche, supra note 8.
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because it had already failed a real-life disaster in the form of a
devastating 2011 earthquake that knocked its semiconductor chip
supplier offline. 307 It later decided to stockpile chips and other supplies
in preparation for unexpected disruptions. 308 White House officials have
considered pushing supply-chain stress tests to encourage similar
preparedness in other companies. 309
It is also worth noting that stress tests of businesses need not
always be mandated by law or government officials. The psychological
problem of leaders paying insufficient attention to rare threats is
something that shareholders or executives may also want to address.
The board or the CEO can require stress tests of the firm if they are
concerned that managers are insufficiently prepared for rare events,
even when the business does not build airplanes or nuclear reactors.
One area for future research is thus how stress tests might improve
corporate governance.
CONCLUSION
Stress tests of agencies and firms have become a widespread tool
in the administrative state. Agencies use them to lessen the chances of
devastation from pandemics, financial meltdowns, environmental
tragedies, nuclear attacks, and many other dangers. In theory, these
simulations can further the core administrative law goal of
accountability by addressing well-known psychological shortcomings
that cause decisionmakers to inadequately identify and weigh risks.
However, too often the tests are secretive, backward-looking, or
inconsequential. Agency leaders can exercise their discretion to
voluntarily improve those shortcomings, but there is little reason to
expect that to happen systematically.
Two years after the 2008 financial crisis, Congress passed the
most sweeping financial reform legislation in generations, establishing
what Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell described as the
“cornerstone” of financial regulation: annual stress testing of
systemically important financial institutions. 310 The COVID-19
pandemic and accompanying recession may present a similar rare
opportunity for a large-scale overhaul. If so, as part of that legislation
307. River Davis, How Toyota Steered Clear of the Chip Shortage Mess, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 7, 2021, 4:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-0407/how-toyota-s-supply-chain-helped-it-weather-the-chip-shortage [https://perma.cc/G4AZ-AZ6J].
308. Id.
309. Tausche, supra note 8.
310. Powell, supra note 58; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 165(i), 124 Stat. 1376, 1430 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5365).
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Congress should consider mandating transparent, imaginative, and
consequential stress tests of public health agencies. Moreover,
lawmakers may want to seize the national sense of vulnerability to go
further and improve upon the widespread use of stress tests across the
administrative state.
As crucial as those specific reforms are to position the
government for success in its most important job of keeping Americans
safe, this Article’s thesis may have even larger implications. The
administrative state has been called the fourth branch of
government. 311 One of the core functions of each branch is to provide a
check on the others. Well-designed stress tests can signal governmental
failure in the existing system of laws, delegated authority, and
executive administration. Stress tests thus can provide not only
accountability for agencies but also a means of signaling when the law
as written by the legislature or implemented by the executive fails to
safeguard society from its biggest threats.
Greater attention is thus needed to stress tests and related tools
that might spur an inert state to action. More gradual threats, such as
climate change and the social media spread of disinformation, may
benefit from simulations of future scenarios that include elements of
stress tests. It is worth exploring, for instance, whether bureaucrats
and even lawmakers should participate in simulations that would force
them to confront a future planet nine degrees hotter and with
significantly more toxic air. Since history has taught that government
leaders often cannot be trusted to take necessary steps absent a looming
threat, the law should sometimes push them to act in the calm between
crises.

311. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 578 (1984) (“Almost fifty years of experience has
accustomed lawyers and judges to accepting the independent regulatory commissions, in the
metaphor, as a ‘headless “fourth branch” ’ of government.”).

